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INTRODUCTION
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is often held to be an exemplar of
a legitimate, effectively functioning institution of international law. By one
count, the international agreements, concessions, and other rules that comprise
the legal code of the WTO's "covered agreements" total more than 27,000
1 2pages. Disputes that arise from these treaties must be resolved by the WTO.
As a testament of confidence in the WTO 's judicial arm, countries have filed
nearly 500 complaints with the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) since
1995. WTO rulings are largely followed,3 and on the few occasions when
compliance is not forthcoming, even the most powerful nations agree to pay
compensation or accept suspension of trade concessions.4 As one scholar has
noted, "Presently, the WTO provides the ideal global organizational vehicle
with the institutional capability to induce countries to participate" in an
international treaty regime.
5
However, a puzzle persists. The conventional wisdom among many
scholars is that the WTO, unlike many other international organizations, is
effective because it "has teeth. ' '6 If a ruling finds that a country is violating a
1. James Bacchus, Chairman, WTO Appellate Body, Groping Toward Grotius: The WTO
and the International Rule of Law, Address at Harvard Law School 8 (Oct. 1, 2002) (transcript available
at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/bacchusgrotius.pdf).
2. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 23,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869
U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU].
3. See Juscelino F. Colares, The Limits of WTO Adjudication: Is Compliance the Problem?,
14 J. INT'L ECON. L. 403, 422 (2011) (finding that even among WTO compliance proceedings, over
ninety-two percent never reach the final retaliation stage, amounting to a total of nine cases where
WTO-sanctioned retaliation was requested because compliance was not forthcoming); William Davey,
The WTO Dispute Settlement System: The First Ten Years, 8 J. INT'L ECON. L. 17, 47 (2005) (finding a
compliance rate of eighty-three percent for WTO decisions issued in its first ten years).
4. An example is the willingness of the WTO to grant the small island-state of Antigua and
Barbuda the right to take action against the United States for its noncompliance with the DSB's ruling in
the US-Gambling case. See, e.g., Decision by the Arbitrator, United States-Measures Affecting the
Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services-Recourse to Arbitration by the United States
Under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS285/ARB (Dec. 21, 2007); see also WTO Dispute Settlement
Body, Minutes of the Meeting, WT/DSB/M/328 (Mar. 22, 2013) at 18-22 (agreeing to grant Antigua
authorization to suspend concessions pursuant to the Arbitrator's report). Another example is the
willingness of the United States to pay compensation to Brazil in lieu of compliance with the DSB's
ruling in the US-Upland Cotton case. See Decision by the Arbitrator, United States-Subsidies on
Upland Cotton: Recourse to Arbitration by the United States Under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article
4.11 of the SCMAgreement, WT/DS267/ARB/1 (Aug. 31, 2009); see also Chana Joffe-Walt, Why U.S.
Taxpayers Are Paying Brazilian Cotton Growers, NPR (Nov. 9, 2010, 3:05 PM),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2011/01/26/131192182/cotton (detailing United States subsidies to
Brazilian cotton farmers).
5. Christopher J. Kula, The Advantages of Utilizing the WTO as a Global Forum for
Environmental Regulation, 1 INT'L L. DIG. 97, 116 (2002) (emphasis added).
6. See, e.g., G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An
Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829, 901 (1995) ("[T]he new WTO system
will make the imposition of costly trade sanctions on recalcitrant defendants virtually automatic. This
power will add new 'bite' to the dispute resolution process and push parties to comply with trade
rulings."); see also Steve Charnovitz, Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 792, 792
(2001) (noting that "[u]ndoubtedly, putting teeth in the WTO was one of the key achievements of the
Uruguay Round ... and a very significant step in the evolution of international economic law" even if
the exact sanctions authorized may undermine the system).
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WTO obligation, the violator is given a fixed time period to reform its actions.
If it remains in breach after this period has expired, then the WTO may
authorize the suspension of trade concessions. 7 This sanctioning power is often
viewed as critical for understanding the WTO's success.
Yet this is only half of the story. Consider instead what happens if a
violator brings its actions back in line with the law before the end of this
period. Under such circumstances, the dispute simply ends. The breaching
party need not pay any compensation. It is not disgorged of any of the
economic gains accrued as a result of its illegal breach. Aggrieved states are
not made whole. In short, the WTO does not provide for retrospective
remedies. Its emphasis is on ensuring post-judgment compliance with the law.
The WTO only grows "teeth" if a country ignores its DSB rulings and
continues to violate the law. But it has little to no bite if a country, after losing
a case, alters its behavior to become lawful once more.
Past scholarship has touched on elements related to this puzzle, but not on
the puzzle itself. Most recently, some scholars have written about the dangers
of the WTO's "remedy gap" and called for various reforms to limit its impact.8
Others have highlighted the inadequacies of WTO remedies and called for a
broadening of their scope.9 Another line of scholarship has focused on the
question of an "efficient breach" of WTO law-that is, whether it may be
worthwhile for a country to pay compensation or endure countermeasures in
order to maintain a violation of WTO law.
10
Yet a more basic and fundamental question lies unanswered: why do
countries bother to adhere to their WTO treaty commitments so strictly in the
first place? If the system lacks retrospective remedies, why don't countries take
advantage of the system's imperfect remedies to engage more frequently in
temporary breaches of WTO law?
By breach, I mean an incidence where a country engages in an outright
violation of its WTO treaty commitment. When referring to a temporary
breach, I therefore mean a breach that is remedied before the system allows for
the authorization of any trade sanctions (i.e., before the expiration of the
"reasonable period of time" in WTO parlance). Note the contrast with the
7. DSU art. 22.2.
8. See, e.g., Rachel Brewster, The Remedy Gap: Institutional Design, Retaliation, and Trade
Law Enforcement, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 102 (2011); Petros C. Mavroidis, Remedies in the WTO
Legal System: Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 763 (2000).
9. See, e.g., Robert E. Hudec, The Adequacy of WTO Dispute Settlement Remedies: A
Developing Country Perspective, in DEVELOPMENT, TRADE, AND THE WTO 81 (Bernard Hoekman et al.
eds., 2002); Joost Pauwelyn, Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules are Rules-Toward
a More Collective Approach, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 335 (2000).
10. See, e.g., Alan 0. Sykes, The Dispute Settlement Mechanism: Ensuring Compliance?, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 560, 568-82 (Anrita Narlikar et al.
eds., 2012); Mostafa Beshkar, Optimal Remedies in International Trade Agreements, 54 EUR. EcON.
REV. 455 (2010); Krzysztof J. Pelc, Eluding Efficiency: Why Do We Not See More Efficient Breach at
the WTO? 9 WORLD TRADE REV. 629-42 (2010); Warren Schwartz & Alan Sykes, The Economic
Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization, 31 J. LEGAL STUD.
179 (2002); Giovanni Maggi & Robert W. Staiger, Breach, Remedies, and Dispute Settlement in Trade
Agreements (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15460, 2009).
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existing literature on efficient breach in WTO law, which is largely concerned
with breaches that persist beyond this period and for which a country must pay
a price through compensation or suspension of trade concessions. What I am
concerned with are instances where the breach is terminated, and therefore no
price is required as far as legal damages are concerned.
In short, the puzzle is the following: because the WTO system lacks
retrospective remedies, the WTO allows countries to violate WTO treaty
commitments for a temporary period without fear of sanctions. This temporary
period is not short. It may range anywhere from three years to upwards of six
or more years, depending on how long it takes its trading partners to discover
the breach, prepare a case, and litigate. Some observers have described this as a
"free pass" granted to WTO members for temporary deviations from their
WTO treaty obligations." For a limited period of time, countries can breach
with impunity. Why don't they do so more frequently?
That is not to say that such breaches do not happen. Both developed and
developing countries do take advantage of this loophole. To the extent that a
breach is detected and a WTO case is launched, temporary breaches appear to
be more commonly employed by developed countries-namely, the United
States and those in the European Union. But there are variances. Japan, for
example, does not employ this tactic nearly as commonly as do other
developed countries. On the other hand, as I will discuss in this Article, China
is increasingly exploiting this loophole. But this is not necessarily the case with
the other emerging economies.
If a country can get away without penalties or sanctions for breach
temporarily, one might expect that it would do so on a fairly regular basis, at
least whenever a temporary breach serves a country's economic interests or a
government's political interests. And if countries did so with regularity, the
reliability of trade treaty commitments might fall apart. Yet this does not
happen. Despite the absence of systemic remedies for temporary breach, the
legal system manages to hold. This begs the question of why we do not see
more temporary violations of trade law.
Understanding the answer to this puzzle is vital for understanding what
makes the WTO work. The answer cannot simply be that the system is
effective because the WTO has "teeth." After all, any country can "defang" the
system by making its breach only temporary. Therefore, considerations other
than WTO-authorized sanctions must play a role in explaining why countries
adhere so strongly to their WTO treaty commitments.
Existing theories attempt to explain treaty compliance through resort to
norms, capacity, liberalism, etc.' 2 However, I argue that a close examination of
WTO law and the patterns of temporary breach does not lend strong support to
11. E.g., Rachel Brewster, Shadow Unilateralism: Enforcing International Trade Law at the
WTO, 40 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1133, 1144 (2009); Note, (In)efficient Breach of International Trade Law:
The State of the "'Free Pass" After China's Rare Earths Export Embargo, 125 HARv. L. REv. 602
(2011).
12. See infra Section I.C.
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any of these explanations. Another stream of scholarship has focused on states'
interests. Some scholars have emphasized the importance of retaliation, 3 while
others have emphasized gains from coordination among subsets of states.
14
While I embrace this analytical framework, I suggest that even their
explanation is incomplete. What is lacking is an understanding of the exact
mechanics for how states exert their interests in this treaty regime and how
these behaviors, in turn, hold the system together in spite of incomplete
remedies.
In this Article, I set forth an answer to this puzzle. I build on the interest-
based theories, but offer a more nuanced and elaborate explanation of the exact
mechanisms at work. Two elements, I suggest, play a key role in explaining
why the WTO system functions effectively in spite of its incomplete remedies:
first, the legal system developed and operates in the face of power
asymmetries, and second, by nature, the WTO agreements are incomplete. As I
will elaborate in this Article, these elements give rise to a dynamic in which
powerful states have a collective interest in ensuring that the WTO rules are
followed and can exert sufficient leverage over smaller and/or weaker states to
bring forth their compliance. I discuss several ways in which they do so,
including trade preference programs, free trade agreements, and other non-
trade-related instruments. Consequently, states largely do adhere to their WTO
treaty commitments, even when the system provides for no legal penalty for a
short-term temporary breach.
If this answer to the puzzle is correct, then it offers several interesting
insights into the WTO and international law: while the WTO is held out to be a
shining example of powerful states ceding control over sovereign economic
and regulatory decisions to international law, the system's success is still due,
in part, to a willingness of powerful states to exert power, albeit within the
confines of an international legal regime. Power still matters, and possibly
more than we think.
This puzzle, I argue, is more than simply an academic exercise of abstract
relevance. At present, the future of the WTO as the central institution for global
trade governance remains very much open to debate. While the rules may be
widely followed, they are in need of updating. Some point to the growing trend
of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) among the major economies (e.g., the
Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership) as a sign that the WTO's efficacy is being eroded. 5 In this
13. See KYLE BAGWELL & ROBERT STAIGER, THE ECONOMICS OF THE WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM 95-103 (2004); see generally THE LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF RETALIATION IN WTO
DIspuTE SETTLEMENT (Chad P. Bown & Joost Pauwelyn eds., 2014) (discussing how the WTO allows
its members to retaliate in cases of continued noncompliance).
14. See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 87-88
(2005).
15. See, e.g., Paul Blustein, Trade Pacts Run Amok, WORLD POL'Y J., Summer 2008, at 13;
Moshe Hirsch, The Sociology of International Economic Law: Sociological Analysis of the Regulation
of Regional Agreements in the World Trading System, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 277, 291 (2008); Rafael Leal-
Arcas, Proliferation of Regional Trade Agreements: Complementing or Supplanting Multilateralism?,
11 CHI. J. INT'L L. 597 (2011).
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narrative, the rise of emerging powers has made consensus in the multilateral
regime difficult, and as a result, the established powers instead are working
outside the WTO system to shape new norms of trade governance.' 6 Others
contend that the despite the rise of PTAs, the WTO remains very much
relevant. Those subscribing to this narrative point to the WTO DSB's role as
the "crown jewel" of a still effective system for which no alternative has
developed outside of the WTO. 17 In other words, the optimists believe that
even if negotiations stall, the WTO will continue to thrive because of its
effective judicial arm, while the pessimists are sounding the alarms. The
resolution of the puzzle at hand sheds important light on the debate about the
future direction of the trade regime.
This Article suggests that we are at a key inflection point for WTO.
While the WTO system has functioned relatively effectively in its first two
decades, its continued success is not assured. Instead, this Article argues that
the WTO's success is contingent on the ability of the system to adapt to
evolving patterns of power that present new challenges to the regime.
Geopolitical shifts pose a threat not only to multilateral trade negotiations, but
also to the underlying stability of the overarching WTO legal regime. I utilize
the temporary breach puzzle as a device to highlight the nature of potential
emerging threats that will challenge systemic stability. These potential flash
points, I suggest, are not system-wide, but instead limited to a few specific
scenarios. Nevertheless, they may prove potent because, by allowing countries
to exploit the temporary breach loophole, they threaten to expose the faults of
what is often considered to be the WTO's strong suit-its judicial role in
resolving global trade disputes.
This Article is organized as follows: Part I explains the underlying
elements of the puzzle. It offers some hypotheses for why those that negotiated
the WTO treaties chose to leave in place the incomplete remedies from the
previous General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) era and also
addresses doubts over whether the dilemma, as I have framed it, actually exists.
It also suggests that several standard explanations for treaty compliance are
inapposite for resolving this puzzle. Part II then presents my theory for why
countries adhere so strongly to WTO law and do not utilize its loophole for
temporary breaches more frequently. The theory builds on standard interest-
based explanations, but provides a more detailed account of the mechanisms at
work in securing compliance. Finally, Part III discusses the implications that
the theory presents for future trade disputes, with an emphasis on emergent
16. See, e.g., Marc Venhaus, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership as a New
Strategy to Marginalize Emerging Power: A Divided Free Trade Order in the Making?, in THE
TRANSATLANTIC COLOSsUS: GLOBAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO BROADEN THE DEBATE ON THE EU-US FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT 59, 61 (Daniel Cardoso et al. eds., 2014); James Thuo Gathii, The Neoliberal Turn
in Regional Trade Agreements, 86 WASH. L. REV. 421, 441-43 (2011).
17. See, e.g., Elizabeth Trujillo, From Here to Beying: Public/Private Overlaps in Trade and
Their Effects on U.S. Law, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 691, 704 (2009) ("[T]he WTO is not dead; rather, it is
very much alive through its own dispute settlement bodies and the regional tribunals that look to WTO
adjudication for guidance and legitimacy.").
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trends that have the potential to alter the relative stability that the WTO system
has experienced to date.
This Article seeks to make four contributions. First, the literature does not
provide a satisfactory explanation for why the imperfection of WTO remedies
has not been more exploited to date. Why is it that countries have not taken
advantage of the legal loopholes that they explicitly negotiated in this regard,
when they have done so with other provisions? The core focus of this Article is
to offer an answer to this puzzle. Second, this Article seeks to add to the larger
body of scholarship examining compliance in the absence, or prior to the
imposition, of sanctions in public law systems writ large.18 To the extent that
the literature has engaged with international law, it has not focused on
international economic law. This Article represents a step to fill that gap. Third,
why is it that the WTO only provides for prospective remedies? Why are
countries so resistant to providing for retrospective remedies in WTO law?
While the problems of the WTO remedies have been examined extensively by
several legal scholars, the literature surprisingly does not provide an account
for why states did not correct for imperfections in remedies when reforming
dispute settlement during the Uruguay Round. Nor does it explain why states
remain so wedded to imperfect remedies. Although such questions are not the
primary focus of this Article, I advance several hypotheses that may be helpful
for future work focused on WTO remedies reform. Finally, in examining the
implications of my answer to the temporary breach puzzle, I draw attention in
Part III to potential tension points that lie ahead for the WTO system. The hope
is that this Article will not only advance our theoretical understanding of the
WTO system as it currently functions, but also inform our views as to where
the trade regime may be heading in light of the shifting patterns of trade.
I. UNDERSTANDING THE TEMPORARY BREACH PUZZLE OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW
A. The WTO's Imperfect Remedies: A Loophole for Temporary
Breaches
While the WTO regime is presumed to have "teeth," its available
remedies are actually quite limited. The WTO judiciary does not possess the
power to issue backward-looking remedies; it cannot address past harms arising
from violations of treaty law. Why was the system created as such? After all,
some systems within international law do provide for retrospective damages.
For example, the international investment regime functions according to the
essential principle that "reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all of the
consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all
probability have existed if that act had not been committed." 19 Statements by
18. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law,
Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791 (2009).
19. Thomas W. Wlde & Borzu Sabahi, Compensation, Damages, and Valuation, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 1049, 1056-57 (Peter Muchlinski et al.
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the United Nations and the statute of its judicial arm, the International Court of
Justice, also reflect this principle.
20
The WTO's practices reflect those of its predecessor, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The GATT operated under a positive
consensus rule, meaning its entire membership needed to agree before the body
could take action. In effect, any state could exercise a veto over a GATT
action. This veto had a potentially crippling effect on the efficacy of dispute
settlement in the GATT era (1947-1994). An accused party could use its veto to
block the establishment of an ad hoc GATT panel to hear the dispute. Even if it
did not, it could later use its veto to block the adoption of an adverse ruling.
What is surprising is that the system managed to function as well as it did for as
long as it did before it threatened to break down in the 1980s.
21
In the shadow of this veto threat, not surprisingly, the GATT provided for
rather weak remedies. The GATT's main emphasis was forward-looking, i.e.,
to ensure that the illegal trade act would stop.22 In most instances, the winning
party was not awarded any compensation for past harms or any other forms of
retrospective damages. In 1979, the GATT codified this approach to remedies
when it adopted the Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation,
Dispute Settlement and Surveillance, which stated:
In the absence of a mutually agreed solution, the first objective of the
CONTRACTING PARTIES [to the GATT] is usually to secure the withdrawal of
the measures concerned if these are found to be inconsistent with the General
Agreement [on Tariffs or Trade, i.e., the GATT]. The provision of compensation
should be resorted to only if the immediate withdrawal of the measure is
impracticable and as a temporary measure pending the withdrawal of the measures
which are inconsistent with the General Agreement. The last resort . . . is the
possibility of suspending the application of concessions or other obligations on a
discriminatory basis vis-A-vis the other contracting arty, subject to authorization by
the CONTRACTING PARTIES of such measures.
A handful of GATT panels deviated from this standard approach and did
authorize retrospective remedies. Seven panels, all adjudicating trade remedy
disputes, required that the violator not only rescind the illegal measure but also
eds., 2008) (quoting the principle as set forth in the 1928 Chorzrw Factory case before the Permanent
Court of International Justice, Factory at Chorzdw (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, 125
(Sept. 13), as the "classic starting point in a damages analysis" in an investment dispute).
20. See, e.g., Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongfil Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83,
Annex art. 36, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Jan. 28, 2002) ("The State responsible for an internationally
wrongful act is under an obligation to compensate for the damage caused thereby, insofar as such
damage is not made good by restitution."); see also Statute of the International Court of Justice art.
36.2(d), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055 (noting that the competent jurisdiction of the ICJ includes that of
deciding "the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international
obligation").
21. See Robert E. Hudec, Daniel L. M. Kennedy & Mark Sgarbossa, A Statistical Profile of
GATT Dispute Settlement Cases: 1948-1989, 2 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 17-25 (1993); see also
Hudec, supra note 9, at 82-83 (highlighting the consensus decision-making process and the lack of
retrospective remedies as central weaknesses of the GATT).
22. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XXII(2), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
23. Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and
Surveillance, Nov. 28, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 210 (1980).
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refund the duty already collected. Of these seven cases, four were blocked
through a veto. 24 Three were adopted, but in only one case (New Zealand-
Electrical Transformers) did the losing party not object to portion of the panel
ruling authorizing a retrospective remedy.25 Notably, it was the major trading
powers-the United States, the European Communities, and Canada-that led
the opposition to extend the scope of GATT remedies. 26 All exercised their
veto to block panel reports seeking to impose retrospective remedies.
In the 1980s, the United States grew frustrated with vetoes of GATT
panel rulings. It threatened unilateral action to enforce trade laws, much to the
dismay of its key trading partners. A new round of trade negotiations, known as
the Uruguay Round, began in 1986 aiming to overcome this and other
problems. It led to the creation of the WTO and a complete overhaul of dispute
settlement rules, governed by a new treaty, the WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU). To render the WTO's dispute settlement process much
more effective than the GATT's, states agreed to a number of important
changes. First, the "positive consensus" rule was eliminated. Second, the DSU
provided for the formation of a standing, seven-member Appellate Body to
review panel decisions. The DSU also added procedural details and timelines
for each stage of adjudication.
Another innovation was the decision to limit the amount of time that a
losing party had to comply with the ruling. The so-called "reasonable period of
27time" is to be decided by the parties or through binding arbitration. In the
event of continued noncompliance after this period expires, the aggrieved party
is then entitled to seek "compensation and the suspension of concessions or
other obligations" but only on a temporary basis while compliance is not
forthcoming. 28 In other words, the so-called sanctions are not designed to
compensate for past harms, but only to exert pressure to comply with the court
ruling. So long as the violator brings its actions back in line within the
"reasonable period of time," then the victorious complainant is not entitled to
any further remedy.
24. These cases are: Report of the Panel, Canada-Countervailing Duty on Boneless
Manufacturing Beef, SCM/85 (Oct. 13, 1987); Report of the Panel, United States-Antidumping Duty on
Stainless Steel Pipes and Tubes from Sweden, ADP/47 (Aug. 20, 1990); Report of the Panel, United
States-Antidumping Duty on Gray Portland Cement and Cement Clinker from Mexico, ADP/82 (July
7, 1992); and Report of the Panel, European Communities-Antidumping Duties on Audio Tapes in
Cassettes Originating from Japan, ADP/136 (Apr. 28, 1995).
25. The three cases are: Report of the Panel, New Zealand-Imports of Electrical
Transformers from Finland, 115814 (July 18, 1985), GATT B.I.S.D. (32nd Supp.) at 55-70 (1986);
Report of the Panel, United States-Countervailing Duties on Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork from
Canada, DS7/R (July 11, 1991), GATT B.I.S.D. (38th Supp.) at 30-47 (1992); and Report of the Panel,
United States-Measures Affecting the Import of Softwood Lumber from Canada, SCM/162 (Oct. 27,
1993), GATT B.I.S.D. (40th Supp.) at 358-517 (1995). For information about how the United States
reserved its position on the merits of the Panel ruling in the latter two cases, see Hudec, supra note 9, at
91 n.9.
26. See supra note 24 (listing the respondents that subsequently vetoed the adoption of the
Panel ruling).
27. DSU art. 21.3(a)-(b).
28. Id. art. 22.1.
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Therefore, the emphasis of WTO dispute settlement remains the same as
that of the GATT-ensuring that a violator eliminate the illegal act and bring
its trade policy back in line with its WTO treaty obligations. Once this is done,
there is no further punishment. Moreover, remedies are only available
temporarily in the face of noncompliance; they disappear as soon as a party
complies. The system is not designed to provide restitution or compensatory
damages.
This gives rise to a "free pass" associated with a temporary breach of
WTO law. No action can be taken against a country so long as it corrects its
illegal trade measure at any point prior to the expiration of the "reasonable
period of time" following the final WTO judgment. Article 22 of the DSU
makes clear that the force of sanctions associated with WTO law-
compensation or suspension of trade concessions-can only be brought to bear
once a WTO member remains in breach after the end of the "reasonable period
of time." So long as a violating party eliminates its breach at any point in the
interim, it can escape punishment.
Just how unusual is this decision to provide the WTO's judicial arm with
limited and incomplete remedies? Consider the analogy with domestic
constitutional law. If a state violates the Dormant Commerce Clause, the
Supreme Court has the power to order the state to alter its law to conform to the
Constitution.29 It does not have the power to specify the exact course of action
that the state should take nor order the payment of retrospective damages to
those who may have suffered harm from the illegal state law.30 Given that
states are reluctant to grant remedial powers to a federal constitutional court, it
may not seem that unusual for sovereign nations to refuse to grant similar
powers to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.
However, there is one important distinction. In the domestic context, a
strong federal government exists that can exert pressure on states to not engage
in temporary breaches to exploit the remedies loophole. No such overarching
sovereign exists in the international context.
Why did the Uruguay Round negotiators leave this loophole for
temporary breaches in place? Certainly, it was not on account of lack of
awareness of alternatives. A handful of GATT panels did attempt to impose
retrospective remedies. The negotiations occurred while the GATT debated
29. See, e.g., Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005) (holding that New York and
Michigan's laws permitting in-state wineries to ship directly to consumers but prohibiting out-of-state
wineries from doing so violated the Dormant Commerce Clause).
30. Just as is the case under WTO law, a state whose law violates the Dormant Commerce
Clause has several choices as to how to change its law to bring it back into conformity. For example,
following Granholm v. Heald, New York changed its laws to allow out-of-state wineries to ship directly
to consumers, but limited all wineries to only thirty-six cases per year. Michigan, on the other hand,
banned all wineries, including in-state ones, from shipping directly to consumers. See William C. Green,
Creating a Common Market for Wine: Boutique Wines, Direct Shipment, and State Alcohol Regulation,
39 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 13, 39-42 (2012); Maureen I_ Ohlhausen & Gregory P. Luib, Moving Sideways:
Post-Granholm Developments in Wine Direct Shipping and Their Implications for Competition, 75
ANTITRUST L.J. 505, 512-13 (2008); Daniel Duggan, Shipping Ban Pours Grief Over Many Wine
Retailers, CRAIN'S DETROIT Bus., Jan. 18, 2009, http://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20090118
/SUBO/901190340/shipping-ban-pours-grief-over-many-wine-retailers.
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these controversial cases. Furthermore, on other dimensions of dispute
settlement, the Uruguay Round negotiators were not hesitant to enact radical
reforms. Why then did negotiators not overhaul remedies as well?
So far, the academic literature has not provided an answer to this
question. 31 Below, I posit several potential explanations.32 First, international
treaty negotiators are constrained by what domestic legislatures will accept
during ratification. 33 Uruguay Round negotiators may have adroitly recognized
that their domestic legislatures would react harshly to the possibility that their
government might be forced to make payments from its treasury to other
foreign governments as a result of a WTO ruling.34 Rather than jeopardize
passage of the entire body of Uruguay Round agreements over this provision,
they instead chose to limit the scope of remedies to only prospective damages.
While such a move may cut against their collective interest of strengthening the
WTO's enforcement mechanism, it was necessary in order to ensure
ratification of the package of treaty agreements.
Second, negotiators may have also calculated that this design would help
maintain long-term domestic support for the new legal regime. Instances where
an international tribunal has ordered a government to pay retrospective
damages have been met with public controversy; examples abound in the
investment regime. 35 In the most extreme instances, a few states have chosen to
exit from the international legal system altogether following a loss.36 In
deciding to not provide for retrospective damages, trade negotiators may have
been exercising plain caution so as to avoid the ratification fights and post-
ratification legitimacy challenges that have plagued other attempts to establish
international dispute settlement mechanisms.
37
31. Two books on the history of the Uruguay Round were written shortly after the conclusion
of the Round, but they do not provide an account of this question. See JOHN CROOME, RESHAPING THE
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: A HISTORY OF THE URUGUAY ROUND (1995); THE GATT URUGUAY
ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992) (Terrence P. Stewart ed., 1993). Archival work remains
difficult at present because many documents remain classified.
32. These explanations are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Furthermore, they are only
hypotheses, as the lack of archival access currently makes them difficult to test. I leave it to future legal
historians to assess their relative explanatory power.
33. Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42
INT'L ORG. 427,435-36 (1988).
34. Furthermore, consider why even in countries that would stand to gain overall from a
retrospective remedies rule, individual legislators may be opposed. The gains from retrospective
damages are concentrated in a handful of citizens who may not be within a legislator's district or
constitute only a small minority within the district. On the other hand, if the payment of retrospective
damages is to be paid out from the general treasury, then the losses are widely shared among the general
populace. Therefore, those who stand to lose from the adoption of retrospective damages in any given
legislator's district will vastly outnumber those who stand to gain, even if the country as a whole gains.
35. See SERGEY RIPINSKY & KEVIN WILLIAMS, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW 55-56 (2008).
36. Among those that have withdrawn from the ICSID Convention are Venezuela, Bolivia,
and Ecuador.
37. This is especially because the largest share of trade disputes litigated concerns allegedly
illegal anti-dumping duties. Few states have granted their governments the legal authority to refund
duties collected in such instances. A government therefore would have to seek authority from the
legislature to pay out the retrospective damages, unless the controls on government spending allowed it
to exercise discretion to spend in such a manner. Both a government's reluctance to seek such
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Third, with any institutional reform effort, only so much can be tackled at
once. Countries require a period to adjust to the newly reformed system before
they are willing to make further changes.38 The negotiating outcome may have
been a reflection of the negotiators' view that other reforms (such as the
elimination of the veto) took higher priority. Negotiators may have decided to
simply leave the question of expanding available remedies for a future
negotiating round.
Finally, the outcome may also be a reflection of power politics. In the
Uruguay Round, the key players involved in negotiating the actual rules were
the so-called Quad countries (the United States, the European Union, Japan,
and Canada). For various reasons, each had a desire to strengthen the dispute
settlement process. Yet each correctly anticipated that it likely would be sued
more frequently in WTO dispute settlement than it would sue. Consequently,
they had a collective interest in adopting relatively weak remedies so as to
minimize the negative consequences of their eventual losses.
Following the Uruguay Round, WTO jurists could have decided to
challenge the lack of retrospective remedies through judicial practice as GATT
panels once did. They have not. No WTO panel has ever ordered the payment
of retrospective remedies as part of its initial ruling. In one case, Australia-
Automotive Leather II, a panel did so as part of a compliance ruling.3
9
Interestingly, the panel acknowledged that the complainant sought only a
prospective remedy and argued against the legality of retrospective remedy.
Nevertheless, after undertaking an object-and-purpose analysis of the SCM
Agreement, the panel decided otherwise.4° The panel added a caveat that it was
not taking a position as to whether retrospective remedies were generally
permissible under the DSU and acknowledged that they may not be. 4 1 Before
the panel's actions could be examined by the Appellate Body, the two sides
settled.42
The Australia-Automotive Leather II decision remains a clear outlier. At
the DSB meeting adopting the panel decision, several countries expressed
concern over the panel's action.43 Academics followed suit, criticizing the
authorization because of its political costs as well as the possibility of the legislature denying such a
request increase the likelihood of noncompliance.
38. See Robert Hudec, The Role of the GA TT Secretariat in the Evolution of the WTO Dispute
Settlement Procedure, in THE URUGUAY ROUND AND BEYOND 101, 119-20 (Jagdish Bhagwati &
Mathias Hirsch eds., 1998).
39. Panel Report, Australia-Subsidies Provided to Producers and Exporters of Automotive
Leather, 10.3, WT/DS126/R (May 25, 1999) [hereinafter Australia--Automotive Leather II].
40. Id. 6.33-.38, 6.48.
41. Id. 6.42.
42. Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Australia-Subsidies Provided to the
Producers and Exporters ofAutomotive Leather, WT/DS 126/11 (July 31, 2000).
43. In addition to Australia, the United States, Canada, Brazil, Japan, the European
Communities, and Malaysia all expressed concerns over the systemic implications of the Panel's
approach. Only Hong Kong expressed unequivocal support of the Panel's use of retrospective remedies.
See Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on 11 February
2000, 5-9, WT/DSB/IM/75 (Mar. 7, 2000).
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panel ruling as not grounded in treaty text or past practice. 4 In subsequent
litigation, parties have made clear that they do not seek retrospective
remedies.45 Though the Appellate Body has never pronounced on the question
of retrospective remedies, WTO jurisprudence and past practice support the
prevailing view that the system only provides for prospective remedies.
B. The Relative Lack of Temporary Breaches
For all the trumpeting of the WTO as a legal regime with genuine
sanctions, the fact is that a giant loophole exists. So long as a country that
breaches its WTO treaty obligations decides to cease its breach before the
expiration of the "reasonable period of time" following the final judgment, it
can escape formal punishment. As discussed above, the framers of the WTO
intentionally created a legal system with a "free pass" for temporary
breaches-a mechanism for WTO members to escape their treaty obligations
temporarily without legal consequence.
One might think that this loophole presents a major challenge for the
WTO legal regime. If temporary breaches offer an escape valve from difficult
trade liberalization commitments, why would governments not take advantage
of this loophole whenever it proved politically expedient? Yet, in spite of this
"free pass," by and large, the conventional wisdom is that states do conform
widely to their WTO treaty obligations.46 They do not readily engage in
temporary breaches.
How do we know this to be true? An alternate state of the world may be
that states engage in temporary breaches widely, but few are ever caught and
even fewer are punished. In other words, how do we know that WTO rules are
not analogous to speed limits-respected as guidelines but frequently
breached?
Like automobile speed, a large number of trade obligations are readily
observable. For example, exporters are subject to a tariff each time their goods
cross borders. Adherence with this commitment is binary; either the actual
tariff levied is in line with a country's WTO commitment or it is not. There is
44. See, e.g., Gavin Gob & Andreas Ziegler, Retrospective Remedies in the WTO After
Automotive Leather, 6 J. INT'L ECON. L. 545 (2003).
45. See, e.g., Panel Report, Canada-Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft-
Recourse by Brazil to Article 21.5 of the DSU, 5.47-.48, WT/DS70iRW (May 9, 2000) (explicitly
noting both parties' request that the Panel not follow the Australia--Automotive Leather 1I ruling). In
infra Section II.C, I discuss a number of reasons why WTO members have been opposed to
retrospective remedies.
46. See, e.g., Beth Simmons, Treaty Compliance and Violation, 13 ANN. REV. POL. Sct. 273,
284 (2010) ("The easiest way to think about compliance with international trade law is to accept [the]
assertion that effectiveness is a good approximation of compliance."); Joanna Langille, Note, Neither
Constitution nor Contract: Understanding the WTO by Examining the Legal Limits on Contracting Out
Through Regional Trade Agreements, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1482, 1483, 1517 (2011) (noting that "[t]he
WTO is often held up as a model for how legally binding obligations can be imposed at the global level"
and that "it is assumed to have significant ability to make member states comply with its laws.").
However, scholars such as Simmons acknowledge the paucity of data, and therefore accurate
knowledge, concerning true compliance rates of states. See Simmons, supra at 284 ("We know
surprisingly little about actual compliance with international trade law.").
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no indeterminacy or subjectivity involved in assessing compliance with bound
tariff rates. The same is true of a commitment to open insurance services to
foreign firms. Still another example is the WTO requirement on minimum
patent terms.47 A country's patent law must be made public, and fixed-term
patents are issued routinely. Adherence is again binary; either a foreign
producer is granted the minimum term or not. The set of readily-observable
obligations is quite large. Each WTO member is asked to declare whether it is
making commitments on over 5,000 tariff lines and 1,800 unique sub-classes of
services.
Note that not all WTO obligations are easily observable. Observing
compliance with some provisions is difficult. For example, this is true if the
meaning of the obligation is vague (e.g., if the drafting was left ambiguous
intentionally).48 Similarly, if the obligation involves a state's behavior toward
its own domestic entities that is not made public, observation is also difficult.
49
The same also can be said of treaty obligations that permit administrative
discretion without mandating sufficient transparency.50 In other words, some
areas of trade law are murky, and compliance is not always clear. However,
such obligations constitute only a minority of WTO treaty obligations.
Compliance with the vast majority (such as those on tariffs) is readily
observable.
Unlike speed limits, easily-observable WTO obligations are also widely
monitored. The relative cost of monitoring is low since monitoring is often
embedded into the course of everyday transactions with customs and regulatory
authorities. Entities that trade then aggregate this information and report it to
their governments. This is true even for countries that represent small export
markets. So long as the potential lost profits related to the breach of a given
obligation outweigh the cost of monitoring that obligation for a given trader,
that trader will find it worthwhile to monitor the obligations that affect its
business. Thus, even the practices of small export markets are being monitored
by those that trade there.
For this universe of readily-observable obligations, we observe very little
47. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 33, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
48. See, e.g., Peter Lindsay, Note, The Ambiguity of GA7T Article XU27: Subtle Success or
Rampant Failure, 52 DUKE L.J. 1277 (2003) (offering the example of the national security exception).
49. An example is that of subsidies provided by governments to their domestic industries. In
recent years, the United States has complained of WTO members not making this information
sufficiently well-known to its trading partners. See Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative, United States Details China and India Subsidy Programs in Submission to WTO (Oct.
2011), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/20 11/october/united-states-details-china
-and-india-subsidy-prog.
50. See generally Robert Wolfe, Regulatory Transparency, Developing Countries and the
WTO, 2 WORLD TRADE REV. 157 (2003) (arguing that transparency between countries is easier to
regulate than transparency within countries because it is easier to adapt economic regulation than social
regulation to international norms). The level of such concerns may vary by country; they have been
expressed with greatest alarm with respect to China. See, e.g., Sarah Biddulph, Through a Glass Darkly:
China, Transparency and the WTO, 3 AUSTRL. J. ASIAN L. 59 (2001); Sylvia Ostry, China and the
WTO: The Transparency Issue, 3 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 1 (1998).
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reporting of behavior by WTO members that is analogous to that of drivers on
a highway. If a country commits to not imposing tariffs above twenty percent,
we do not hear of complaints that it has set tariffs at twenty-two percent. If a
country commits to providing a minimum patent term of twenty years, we do
not hear of complaints that it only grants eighteen years of protection to certain
entities. Nor do we hear frequently of discriminatory grants of licenses to
foreign providers of a given service if a country has committed to opening up
the market for that service unconditionally. Rather, the prevailing view among
scholars and practitioners alike is that "the level of compliance with trade
commitments is quite high, even if there is no credible threat of sanctions for
misbehavior."
51
The relatively low volume of trade disputes brought before the WTO
serves to reinforce this view. Between 1995 and 2013, a total of 469 formal
complaints were filed with the WTO. This works out to an average of
approximately twenty-five complaints per year, a relatively low figure
considering the WTO's overall membership now stands at 160 countries. On
average, a case is brought against a country once every six years.
The number of WTO disputes serves as one proximate indicator of the
infrequency of temporary breach. But it is not conclusive. After all, not all
trade-related disputes result in WTO cases. Some may be addressed in other
venues outside of the WTO 2 Moreover, litigation is costly. Some countries
may lack the legal or financial capacity to bring forward a case.53 Even those
with resources may deem a certain breach to be too trivial to warrant spending
funds on litigation. In addition, a country may have a variety of economic
and/or political reasons to refrain from bringing a WTO case against a given
trading partner.5 4 Furthermore, as I discuss later in this Article, some countries
also possess other means to secure compliance outside of filing a case.
Therefore, the fact that the volume of WTO cases is low does not, by itself,
indicate strong compliance with WTO treaty obligations.
Yet, going beyond the number of disputes to prove that countries strongly
adhere to their WTO obligations is harder than one might think. It is difficult to
quantify the exact number of WTO commitments made by any given country.
51. Schwartz & Sykes, supra note 10, at 200.
52. For example, disputes over an agricultural product regulation might be addressed by the
U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization; those over a particular product standard may be addressed by
the relevant international standards organization; and those over a particular form of intellectual
property might be addressed by the World Intellectual Property Organization.
53. Despite the growing use of WTO dispute settlement by developing countries, an African
country has yet to bring a case before the WTO. See Disputes by Country/Territory, WORLD TRADE
ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispue/dispubycountry_e.htm (last visited Dec. 4, 2014)
[hereinafter Disputes by Country/Territory] (noting that African countries have participated as
defendants and third parties but not yet as a claimants); see also Amnin Alavi, African Countries and the
WTO's Dispute Settlement Mechanism, 25 DEV. POL'Y REV. 25 (2007) (explaining the impediments to
African participation in WTO dispute settlement).
54. See Andrew T. Guzman & Beth A. Simmons, Power Plays and Capacity Constraints:
The Selection of Defendants at the World Trade Organization, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 557 (2005) (finding
support for the impact of capacity constraints, but no support for the hypothesis that small states
exercise self-restraint in bringing cases against powerful states).
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Nor is it always possible to readily observe whether each given commitment is
being followed for the reasons discussed above. This makes it nearly
impossible to gather information on an exact compliance rate. As Beth
Simmons acutely observes, "Systematic research on compliance with
international trade law is much more difficult than one would expect.
Accumulating a convincing data set on compliance with treaty law in this area
would be a mind-boggling endeavor."
55
Nevertheless, even in the face of incomplete data, I suggest that it is
possible to develop an overall sense of the relative degree to which countries
adhere to their WTO commitments. Even without a comprehensive data set, it
is possible to develop an estimate of the prevalence of temporary breaches by
estimating two figures: (1) the percentage of breaches resulting in WTO
litigation, and (2) the total number of WTO treaty commitments in existence.
With these two estimates, we can then determine a numerator and denominator
for calculating an estimated ratio of WTO treaty obligations being breached.
Using the best-available data, I assume that only five percent of breaches
result in the filing of a WTO complaint.5 6 In other words, I assume that
nineteen out of every twenty breaches of WTO law either go unobserved or are
observed but not deemed worthy of a case filing. Furthermore, pressure may be
brought on states not to file cases. In addition, at times, other non-trade
interests (e.g., security) may trump, leading a country to turn a blind eye to a
trade problem. All this contributes to the relatively low rate of actual case
filings. Even so, the assumption that only five percent of all breaches are ever
litigated may seem extreme. However, as my intention is to err on the side of
overestimating the prevalence of breaches, I adopt this assumption.
In addition, I note that as a lower bound, the WTO has well over 7,000
55. Simmons, supra note 46, at 284.
56. See CHRISTINA DAVIS, WHY ADJUDICATE? ENFORCING TRADE RULES IN THE WTO 9
(2012). Note that Davis's research focused on a subset of problems noted by the United States in the
National Trade Estimates Report (NTER) and found that WTO cases were filed in only approximately
five percent of such instances. While Davis's analysis of Japanese trade commitments is not necessarily
a representative sample, no other scholar, so far as I am aware, has conducted the detailed work
necessary to arrive at an estimate using a broader (and more representative) sample.
Several reasons exist as to why the five percent estimate may be an underestimate. First, Davis
notes that not all of the complaints raised in the NTER are violations of WTO commitments; some are
trade issues for which it is not clear that Japan is in direct breach. Id. This suggests that the denominator
should be smaller than the one used by Davis, leading to a higher case-filing rate. Second, the United
States and Japan may share certain strategic and policy preferences, leading the United States to not
bring a case for a given breach that it otherwise would against another country. Third, the United States
and Japan have a long-standing partnership. Some have suggested that Japan prefers to settle trade
disputes informally, thereby leading to fewer cases being filed against Japan. See Ji Li, Note, From "See
You in Court!" to "See You in Geneva!": An Empirical Study of the Role of Social Norms in
International Trade Dispute, 32 YALE J. INT'L L. 485, 495-97, 503 (2007). Counteracting these forces,
however, is the fact that the case-filing rate may be lower for an economy less important than Japan's.
Note that the case-filing rate is used to calculate the numerator in determining the overall
noncompliance rate. If, for the reasons discussed above, the five percent rate is an underestimate, then
this will lead to a smaller numerator and a lower overall noncompliance rate. This further reinforces the
overall point that the vast majority of WTO commitments are being complied with by WTO members.
On the other hand, if this assumption is an overestimate, then this will mean a higher noncompliance
rate. However, as discussed below, it would have to be off by a large order of magnitude to defeat the
overall point. This is unlikely to be the case.
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unique policy items for which it requires countries to either make a binding
treaty commitment or to indicate that it is opting out of doing so.57 This may
seem low, but again my intention is to err on the side of overestimating
noncompliance. I assume that the rate of opting out of making treaty
commitments varies by type of country, with opt-out rates being much higher
for developing countries than developed countries and highest for least-
developed countries.58 In addition, I assume that somewhere between twenty-
five to ninety percent of the binding commitments represent true concessions,
with the exact percentage again varying by the type of country.
59
Using these assumptions, I arrive at an estimated noncompliance rate of
approximately 0.6%.60 This estimated rate is inexact, but it is based on
57. This lower bound figure is derived as follows: As mentioned, a WTO member makes
readily-observable commitments on tariffs at the HS-6 level, for which there are approximately 5,000
unique categories. See What Is the Harmonized System (HS)?, WORLD CUSTOMS ORG.,
http://www.wcoomdorg/enltopics/nomenclature/overview/what-is-the-harmonized-system.aspx (last
visited Dec. 4, 2014). It also makes readily-observable commitments on services using the U.N. Central
Product Classification scheme, which is comprised of more than 1,800 unique sub-classes at the 5-digit
level. See Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of
Gambling and Betting Services, 200, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7,2005) (adopted Apr. 20,2005). While
there are more than 200 unique commitments to be found in the other WTO agreements, I use the figure
of 7,000 commitments as a lower-bound figure for the denominator.
58. Specifically, I assume that developing countries make only half as many binding
commitments as developed countries and that least-developed countries (LDCs) make only twenty-five
percent as many commitments as developed countries (and hence, only half as many as other developing
countries). In other words, I assume that seventy-five percent of WTO obligations are inapplicable to
LDCs, either because they opt out or because of built-in treaty measures that exempt them provisionally.
59. Here I assume that the rate is higher for developing countries and least-developed
countries, as they have less bargaining power in the negotiations and would more likely exercise their
power to seek an opt-out of making a concession on a given tariff line or services sector. In addition, I
assume higher rates for smaller developed countries that were not at the core of the negotiations. The
lowest rates are reserved for the core "Green Room" countries that were at the heart of the Uruguay
Round negotiations. Finally, I also assume higher concession rates for WTO members that acceded after
1995, as the asymmetries in negotiating power for such countries means that a high percentage of their
commitments should represent concessions.
Specifically, in making my calculations, I adopted the following assumptions: For developed
countries, I assumed that of the commitments made, only twenty-five percent were true concessions for
"Green Room" countries and fifty percent for non-"Green Room" countries. In other words, I assumed
that seventy-five percent of a given "Green Room" countries' commitments and half of all other
developed countries' commitments represented their existing or underlying preference at the time of
negotiations. For developing countries and LDCs, recall my earlier assumption that each undertook
fewer total binding commitments; I assumed that developing countries undertook only half and LDCs
only one-quarter of the number of binding commitments that developed countries undertook. See supra
note 58. Of the binding commitments undertaken, I assumed that seventy-five percent represented
genuine concessions for developing countries and ninety percent for LDCs.
60. 1 employ as my unit of analysis a country's action on a given WTO commitment in a
given year. I assume that the average length of a given breach is five years. This is likely to be too high,
especially if a country relies on measures other than WTO litigation to bring its trading partner's actions
back in line with a WTO commitment, but I nevertheless err toward a higher rate.
To arrive at an estimated noncompliance rate, I do the following: for the numerator, I multiply
the total number of cases by the estimated ratio of non-litigated temporary breaches to litigated
temporary breaches and by the estimated number of years in which a given breach is presumed to
persist. For the denominator, I first calculate an estimate of the total number of commitments undertaken
by each type of country (which differs, depending on whether it is advanced, developing, or LDC, and
on whether or not it was a "Green Room" country) and then multiply it by the percentage of
commitments representing concessions and the number of countries within that subset. I then calculate
the total sum across the different subsets and multiply this sum by the total number of years.
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reasonable assumptions made in light of best-available information. It suggests
that at any given moment, the vast majority of WTO obligations are being
observed by most states. Moreover, the important emphasis ought not to be on
the exact estimate but the overall point. Already, the assumptions adopted are
designed to skew in favor of a higher noncompliance rate. But even if one takes
major issue with my assumptions, the overall conclusion still does not change.
For example, even if one supposes that my assumptions are off by a factor of
twenty-five (e.g., if one supposed that only one out of every 500 temporary
breaches is ever litigated), the fact still remains that over eighty-five percent of
WTO obligations would be observed.
Therefore, my rough analysis based on the best-available data suggests
that states do not readily exploit the "free pass" available in WTO law. The
prevailing view that compliance levels with WTO law are high appears likely
to be correct. I leave it to future empirical work to further validate this point.
Could the high compliance rate be because WTO members are unaware
of the "free pass"? This is highly unlikely. WTO dispute settlement data
indicate that governments are aware and factor the "free pass" into their
policymaking. The WTO, like other courts, affords the parties an opportunity to
reach a negotiated settlement in lieu of a trial. In a standard litigation setting,
one expects the "obvious" cases with relatively low legal uncertainty to be
settled, thereby causing the plaintiff win rate to be approximately fifty
percent. 61 However, in exceptional circumstances where parties have
differentiated stakes, the success rate can be much higher for a variety of
reasons.62 The WTO qualifies as such a setting. Of the WTO cases that proceed
to final judgment, approximately nine out of every ten result in a ruling against
the respondent.
63
One might suppose that the high plaintiff-win rate is due to the
intransigence of governments. After all, governments find it politically difficult
to modify a policy benefiting a particular constituency. However, in fact, this is
not the case. After the judgment is issued, studies fird that governments
generally reverse course. Willingness to revise policy to conform to WTO
law is high after a judgment is issued, just not beforehand.
What changes? First, the WTO ruling makes reversal less politically
costly. Governments can now fall back on the excuse of "the WTO made me
do it" to explain policy reversals. Second, and more importantly, until the
ruling was issued, the illegal policy was costless so far as legal remedies are
concerned. This is an important difference from the standard litigation context
61. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 17-20 (1984).
62. See id. at 20-29 (modeling why differentiated stakes cause outcomes to drift away from
the fifty percent rate).
63. See List of WTO Disputes with Indication of Whether at Least One Violation Was Found,
WORLDTRADELAW.NET, http:/lwww.worldtradelaw.net/databases/violationlist.php (last visited Dec. 4,
2014); see also Jennifer Hillman, An Emerging International Rule of Law?-The WTO Dispute
Settlement System's Role in its Evolution, 42 OTAWA L. REv. 269, 278 (2010).
64. Colares, supra note 3.
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where the court has the power to issue retrospective remedies. Even knowing
that its policy will be found illegal, a government has no reason to reach a
settlement if the benefits of continued breach outweigh the additional marginal
costs incurred during the litigation period. Thus, the high pro-plaintiff pattern
of WTO rulings is itself indicative of governments' willingness to take
advantage of the "free pass" afforded by WTO law once a government has
decided to engage in a breach.
Therefore, the puzzle that I posit is not simply an academic one. As
Section L.A demonstrated, WTO law provides for an incomplete set of
remedies. The lack of retrospective remedies provides violators of WTO law
with a "free pass" that lasts for several years. Governments, when they breach,
do avail themselves of this feature, as exemplified by the above discussion that
more defendants are willing to litigate a losing dispute through to a final ruling
than standard litigation theory would suggest. But governments do not do so
frequently. Although we do not know the exact noncompliance rate with WTO
treaty obligations, based on assumptions made from available data, breaches of
most WTO obligations appear to be relatively rare. The puzzle is why, given
the "free pass" created by the WTO's incomplete remedies, temporary breaches
are not more prevalent.
After all, governments routinely face political pressure from import-
competing constituencies. Moreover, even for a government committed to
greater economic liberalization, not all its WTO commitments may line up with
its economic agenda. Availing itself of the "free pass" prior to and during the
litigation proceedings, while complying with the judgment against it
afterwards, would appear to be a rational way of paying off a domestic
constituency temporarily while still adhering to the letter of the agreement. Yet
the analysis suggests that while countries are no doubt aware of the benefits of
temporary breach, they do not take advantage of it frequently. The puzzle that
requires explanation is why this is the case.
C. Discrepancies in Use Patterns of the Temporary Breach Loophole
Among WTO Members
One other set of facts is important to note about this puzzle. Based on the
imperfect proxies that we can observe, it appears that exploitation of the
temporary breach loophole is highly uneven across states. In general,
developed countries tend to utilize the loophole with greater frequency than
developing countries. Of course, this is a sweeping generalization, and as
discussed below, discrepancies exist within each group. Nevertheless, this may
seem surprising, given that the Uruguay Round agreements are described as
reflective of terms that favor developed countries' interests. Thus, one might
think that the rule-takers rather than the rule-makers would be more prone to
breach. But this does not appear to be the case.
One proxy, albeit a highly imperfect one, is the number of disputes
brought against a WTO member. Over forty percent of the cases brought before
the WTO are against just two members: the United States and the European
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Union.65 Recently, a third member, China, has also become a frequent target of
WTO litigation.66 On the other hand, over one hundred countries in the WTO
have never had a complaint filed against them. 67 One might posit size of the
economy to be the dominant explanatory factor for this discrepancy. Yet
consider the fact that Japan, which is the world's third largest economy, has
faced relatively few complaints.68 By contrast, the Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Trinidad and Tobago have all defended multiple
cases, 69 despite the fact that none feature among the world's top fifty
economies. Though the size and importance of the breaching party's economy
most certainly factor into a decision as to whether or not to pursue WTO
litigation, this is not absolutely determinative. WTO cases are brought against
small economies. 70 Discrepancies in dispute settlement cannot be explained
fully by variance in size.
7 1
As discussed earlier, the number of complaints is a highly imperfect
indicator of temporary breach. For various reasons, a country that observes a
trading partner's breach may choose not to file a complaint against it.
Therefore, we turn to a second proxy indicator that lends further support to the
trends noted in the previous paragraph.
Besides litigation, the WTO provides a second mechanism for its
members to monitor and raise concerns about one another's practices known as
the Trade Policy Review (TPR) mechanism. The WTO notes that "[t]hese 'peer
reviews' by other WTO members encourage governments to follow more
closely the WTO rules and disciplines and to fulfill their commitments." 72 As
part of the process, WTO members are allowed to submit questions which the
country being reviewed must answer. Not all of the questions raised are
necessarily concerns over potential breaches, but the TPR does provide an
avenue for trading partners to express issues and policies of concern without
going so far as filing a complaint. Over the course of time, all WTO members
65. See Disputes by Country/Territory, supra note 53.
66. China accounts for nearly twenty percent of the most recent 160 cases. See id.
67. See id
68. Japan has defended only fifteen cases before the WTO, which is roughly one-tenth of the
number of cases faced by the United States. See id.
69. Id.
70. In 2013 alone, complaints were filed against Pakistan, Ukraine, Colombia, and Peru.
Request for Consultations by Indonesia, Pakistan-Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty
Investigations on Certain Paper Products from Indonesia, WT/DS470/I (Dec. 2, 2013); Request for
Consultation by Japan, Ukraine-Definitive Safeguard Measures on Certain Passenger Cars,
WT/DS468/1 (Nov. 4, 2013); Request for Consultations by Panama, Colombia-Measures Relating to
the Importation of Textiles, Apparel and Footwear, WTIDS461/1 (June 20, 2013); Request for
Consultations by Guatemala, Peru-Additional Duty on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products,
WT/DS457/1 (Apr. 16, 2013); see Chronological List of Dispute Cases, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/dispu-status-e.htm (last visited Dec. 4, 2014).
71. For studies that show that other variables besides GDP are significant in explaining the
use of the dispute settlement system, see, for example, Chad P. Bown, Participation in WTO Dispute
Settlement: Complainants, Interested Parties, and Free Riders, 19 WORLD BANK ECON. REv. 287, 305
(2005); and Li, supra note 56, at 503, 513.
72. See Trade Policy Reviews: Ensuring Transparency, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis-e/tif elagrml I e.htm (last visited Dec. 4, 2014).
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are subject to review, with reports issued regularly following each TPR.
The stakes with a TPR are much lower. There is no danger of sanctions
resulting from a TPR. One simply raises a question, but in doing so, one signals
to a trading partner that its policy is being watched. Such action, however, is
much less likely to incur another country's wrath, as tens, if not hundreds, of
questions are raised at each TPR. No legal fees are incurred, making capacity
and cost much less of an issue.
Therefore, the depth of questioning in TPRs serves as an indicator of the
level of concern that WTO countries have over their trading partner's
potentially-problematic practices and policies. It offers a second proxy for
temporary breach, albeit also an imperfect one as countries with more opaque
policymaking may trigger more questions. As part of this project, I tabulated
the total number of pages spent on the Q&A portion of each country's TPR in
the WTO era. Table 1 presents my results. Again, the two leaders are the
European Union and the United States. As Table 1 shows, more than three
times as many pages have been devoted to questioning European and American
trade policies than those of India or Brazil. Not surprisingly, China follows
closely behind.
Because the frequency of review varies by country and the length of the
TPRs has grown over the years, I also calculate the average number of pages
per Q&A session. My results are shown in Table 2. When examined in this
manner, China takes the top spot, but again, the European Union and the
United States are still among the top three.
Although there is significant overlap between those countries against
which cases are most frequently filed and those that undergo the most extensive
questioning during their TPR, a few noteworthy differences emerge. Japan has
seen relatively few cases filed against it, but as Tables 1 and 2 indicate, its
policies have undergone vigorous review during its TPRs. The same is true of
Vietnam. Also, as noted earlier, no WTO case has been filed against over
ninety countries. Yet, within this group, there are vast differences in terms of
the vigor of questioning during TPRs. For example, the last TPR of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo resulted in a Q&A that was 2.5 times longer
than that of Zambia (a similarly-sized African economy). Also, simply because
a case has not been filed against a country does not mean that it is not being
rigorously monitored. For example, no WTO case has ever been brought
against a member of the East African Community. Yet, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo's last TPR resulted in a Q&A session that was nearly as
extensive as that of Australia, a country that has defended fifteen cases before
the WTO and whose economy is fifteen times larger. 73 These figures suggest
that the Q&A sessions of TPRs offer a useful proxy for gauging concerns over
temporary breach.
73. The combined GDP of the five countries of the EAC was approximately $100 billion in
2012, whereas that of Australia was $1.564 trillion. U.N. STATISTICS Div., GDP AND ITS BREAKDOWN
AT CURRENT PRICES IN US DOLLARS (2013).
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Still, overall, the analysis of TPRs serves to reinforce the notion that most
frequent users of the "free pass" are the advanced economies-and in
particular, the United States and European Union. Among developing
countries, China stands out. The practices of a handful of other developing
countries (e.g., Vietnam, India, Argentina, and Brazil) also raise concern, but
not nearly as extensively as those of the two leading advanced economies.
What about the possibility that because of prioritization in allocating
monitoring resources, small states simply "fly under the radar"? Are small
states breaching frequently but going undetected? The answer is no.
Monitoring costs for the majority of tariff and services commitments are so low
that even the trade policies of small economies are being monitored with
relatively high intensity. Take the example of Belize, which ranks as the 170th
largest economy in the world, placing it in the bottom decile of WTO
members. 74 The Q&A session of its last TPR was not particularly rigorous, as
no Belizean trade policy was causing much controversy at the time. Even so,
thirteen WTO members submitted queries about potential issues.75 This subset
was not limited to its immediate regional neighbors, but also included major
powers such as the United States, the European Union, and Japan, and rising
powers such as Brazil, India, and Turkey. 76 This is despite the fact that exports
to Belize amount to less than 0.02% of total exports for all of these powers.
77
Therefore, the trade actions of even the smallest (and relatively
uncontroversial) states are being monitored vigorously. The few that trade there
can do so with relatively low cost and then aggregate this information for their
governments. Thus, it is incorrect to believe that there is a category of smaller
states whose trade policies are not being regularly observed.
This discrepancy in use patterns is interesting because it rules out several
potential explanatory factors. First, the frequency of temporary breach does not
appear to be related to capacity. 78 Contrary to what might be expected, low-
capacity states do not engage in more temporary breaches than high-capacity
states. Furthermore, within each category, there are wide discrepancies-as
exemplified by the differences between the United States and Japan or the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia.
Second, whether a country strongly complies or engages in frequent
temporary breaches does not appear to be linked to the strength of its
74. Gross Domestic Product 2013, WORLD BANK 3 (Sep. 24, 2014), http://databank
.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf.
75. World Trade Org. Secretariat, Report by the Secretariat: Trade Policy Review: Belize, 10-
21, WT/TPR/S/238 (Sept. 29, 2010).
76. Id.
77. Author's calculation is based on export data available for 2009 (year prior to the last
Trade Policy Review) in the U.N. Comtrade database. U.N. Dep't of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, UN
Comtrade Database, UNITED NATIONS, http://comtrade.un.org/data/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2014). For
India, Japan, and Turkey, Belize was the destination of approximately 0.00 1% of their exports.
78. See, e.g., Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 47 INT'L ORG. 175
(1993). According to their theory, there exists "a general propensity of states to comply with
international obligations." Id. at 178. Failure to comply results from several managerial factors tied to
capacity.
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transnational networks and the extent of repeat interactions by its transnational
actors in horizontal and vertical legal processes.79 In other domains, including
specific elements of trade law, strong interactive processes involving a state's
transnational actors are believed to exert a strong compliance pull as states
internalize international legal norms. 80 Yet here, the states whose actors are
among the most active in such processes are among those that most frequently
engage in temporary breaches.8'
Third, temporary breaches also appear to be unrelated to either the
political orientation of the government 82 or the degree to which a country
perceives the regime to be "fair" to its interests. 83 Although the WTO regime
was advanced by liberal states and may be emblematic of a neoliberal vision,
unlike other areas of international law, liberal states are not more prone to
comply with WTO treaty obligations than non-liberal states.84 The parties most
frequently alleged to breach WTO obligations are the United States and
European Union, the two bedrocks of the trade regime's supposedly liberal
order. By contrast, until China's emergence as a trading power in the mid-
2000s, very few non-liberal states were ever alleged to violate their WTO
obligations. Of the WTO's first 300 cases, only three were brought against
85states that are classified as anything less than a functioning democracy. In
79. For work emphasizing the importance of transnational legal processes for international
treaty compliance, see Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. Rev. 181 (1996);
and Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997).
80. For example, the theory helps to explain why certain actors in developing countries
pushed for the adoption of anti-dumping laws and more rigorous enforcement of such laws against
imports.
81. For example, over the past decade, the three parties most frequently accused of breach are
the United States, European Union, and China. They are also among the most active in their
participation in WTO Trade Policy Reviews, DSB proceedings as third parties, and WTO committees.
See Trade Policy Review Mechanism C.2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 3, 1869 U.N.T.S. 480 (noting greater frequency of reviews for WTO
members with a greater share of world trade); Disputes by Country/Territory, supra note 53 (noting
higher participation rates in dispute settlement). Participation in committees can be discerned from
publicly-available minutes of each committee.
82. For examples of liberal theories of international law, see, for example, Andrew
Moravcsik, Liberal Theories of International Law, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART 83, 84 (Jeffrey Dunoff
& Mark Pollock eds., 2012); and Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Liberal Theory of International Law, 94 AM.
SOC'Y OF INT'L L. PROC. 240, 240-42 (2000).
83. See, e.g., THOMAS FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 433-
34 (1995) (suggesting that creation of a rules-based WTO represents a significant "infusion of genuine
fairness into the global trading system," which, in turn, makes states less likely to breach).
84. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EuR. J.
INT'L L. 503, 532-33 (1995) (suggesting that transnational legal orders created by liberal states are likely
to be more stable and effective because similar domestic constraints among liberal states "create the
conditions in which States entering into an international agreement have reason to believe that their co-
parties are equally constrained" and therefore causing all parties to be more likely to uphold their initial
bargain as well as accept the rulings of a neutral supranational tribunal). For an example of such an
order and discussion of the elements necessary for its success, see Laurence R. Heifer & Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273 (1997).
85. The classification of states for purposes of this figure is based on its ranking in the Polity
IV index, which provides an annual rating of a country's regime type. See Polity IV Project: Political
Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2013, CENTER FOR SYSTEMIC PEACE,
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4x.htm (last visited Dec. 4, 2014). The three illiberal
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addition, those countries that have complained publicly of the international
economic order being unfair (such as Venezuela and Bolivia) do not appear to
engage in temporary breaches with high frequency.
Finally, this discrepancy in use patterns also suggests that the differences• 86
seen in patterns of overall compliance are not the result of social construction.
It is not the case that those countries more frequently accused of breach have
had different modes of social interactions within the international regime that
would cause them to be more willing to breach WTO treaty obligations
temporarily. Their transnational actors are embedded with the same formal
structures and belong to the same epistemic communities as those from
countries not frequently accused of breach.
What then explains why WTO members strongly comply with their treaty
obligations, even if they can get away with breach temporarily for five or more
years? Why does the system work if the WTO system's formal sanctions are
not what is doing the work? Moreover, while overall noncompliance is low,
what explains discrepancies in behavior among certain states?
The literature on compliance within international trade regime has tended
to avoid the puzzle at hand.87 Instead, scholars have focused on the narrower
question of why we see strong compliance with the WTO's adjudicatory
decisions. 88 While we possess a robust body of theoretical scholarship
explaining compliance with WTO rulings, we know significantly less about the
reasons for why we see strong compliance with WTO treaty obligations
generally, especially when the system allows for temporary breaches without
payment of compensation. In Part II, I advance a theory to explain why
countries, even when given a "free pass" for temporary breach, still largely
comply with their WTO obligations.
II. WHY NATIONS FOLLOW WTO RULES DESPITE IMPERFECT REMEDIES
The theory that I offer builds off a standard explanation that states
generally comply with international law because of the role played by the so-
countries against which disputes were brought were Egypt, Pakistan, and Peru.
86. See also Andrew Cortell & Susan Peterson, Synthesizing Rationalist and Constructivist
Approaches to International Organizations: Lessons from the WTO and WHO (2006) (unpublished
manuscript), http://wmpeople.wm.edu/asset/index/smpete/synthesizing (discussing the behavioral
tendencies of the WTO and WHO towards autonomous preference selection); see generally MARTHA
FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (1996) (exploring the conditions under
which international systems impact the behavior of sovereign actors ex ante).
87. To the extent that some scholars have addressed this question, they have done so
primarily on general terms related to theories of how international law operates overall. See, e.g.,
ANDREW GUZMAN, How INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY (2008)
(emphasizing the importance of the "three Rs" of reputation, retaliation, and reciprocity generally in
international law).
88. See, e.g., Rachel Brewster & Adam Chilton, Supplying Compliance: Why and When the
United States Complies with WTO Rulings, 39 YALE J. INT'L L. 201 (2014); Brendan McGivern,
Seeking Compliance with WTO Rulings: Theory, Practice and Alternatives, 36 INT'L L. 141 (2002);
Bruce Wilson, Compliance by WTO Members with Adverse WTO Dispute Settlement Rulings: The
Record to Date, 10 J. INT'L ECON. L. 397 (2007).
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called "three Rs:" reputation, reciprocity, and retaliation. 89 Although critics of
interest-based theories decry these explanations as overly state-centric, 90 I
suggest that, for this particular puzzle, the state ought to be the key focus of
analysis. Under the WTO regime, it is the state alone that ultimately decides
whether to breach, and if so, for how long.91 Analyses of the interests of the
states in question go a long way toward enhancing our understanding of why
the system has worked to date.
Our understanding of how the "three Rs" come into play in the
international trade regime, however, is incomplete. To date, the scholarship has
focused primarily on the role of these three factors in securing compliance with
WTO judicial rulings. Although scholars have also suggested that the factors
help secure compliance with WTO law overall even in the absence of judicial
sanctions, the literature has not elaborated on the specific mechanics of
compliance. How is it that these factors explain why countries do not exploit
the WTO's remedies loophole and engage in widespread temporary breach? To
revert back to the speed limits analogy, why don't we see countries behaving
like drivers on a highway? Why aren't countries frequently violating WTO
rules temporarily and obeying only once they notice a potential enforcer? How
is it that they manage to keep each other in check?
What follows in Part II is my attempt to offer a more detailed and robust
explanation of why countries comply with WTO rules even in the absence of
formal sanctions for a temporary breach. Much more than past scholars, I
elaborate on the exact mechanisms through which states, acting out of self-
interest, manage to create a system that dissuades their trading partners from
engaging in widespread temporary breach. Note that I readily acknowledge that
some amount of temporary breach does occur. My theory simply seeks to
explain why the phenomenon is not widespread, and why we see the
discrepancies in use patterns noted earlier.
Past interest-based scholarship on trade law has not tackled the temporary
breach puzzle head on, but has instead examined two sets of closely related
questions. The first is why states would bother to structure a dispute settlement
regime with the possibility of obtaining no compensation through litigation.
Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner posit that the system provides information
about the extent (if any) to which a given action constitutes a violation, "or it
can choose an outcome that would serve as a focal point for the coordination of
states. ' 92 Their work draws from Giovanni Maggi's insight that the monitoring
and information dissemination effects of multilateral dispute settlement are
independently valuable because they can help sustain multilateral
89. See GUZMAN, supra note 87.
90. See, e.g., Martti Koskenniemi, The Place of Law in Collective Security, 17 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 455, 464-81 (1996); see also Jeff W. Legro & Andrew Moravcsik, Is Anybody Still a Realist?, 24
INT'L SEC. 5 (1999) (discussing these criticisms).
91. This is because WTO law only allows for complaints against states made by other states.
92. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 14, at 153.
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cooperation.93 Therefore, even if the legal rules prevent the litigant from
acquiring damages for past harms, so long as the litigant seeks sustained
cooperation, it will find the dispute settlement process valuable.
94
A second stream of scholarship has focused on the question of why
despite the in-built incentives for breach, states nevertheless refrain from doing
so. Kyle Bagwell and Bob Staiger's work has been extremely valuable in this
regard. They emphasize the importance of the long-term costs of retaliation and
states' desire to avoid incurring such costs as playing a pivotal role in
sustaining long-term cooperation.95 In addition, they focus on the additional
flexibility provided by legal temporary "escape clauses" in the treaties as
providing an alternative to short-term breach.96
Both streams of scholarship emphasize the role of reciprocity and
retaliation. Neither stream, however, directly addresses the puzzle at hand.
Although Goldsmith and Posner write a decade after the WTO's Dispute
Settlement Understanding has been operationalized, they are careful to limit
their analysis to the historical question of why the trade regime operated
successfully in the GATT era despite the possibility of losing parties exercising
a veto. 97 They avoid extending their theory to the WTO era to explain why the
present system operates successfully despite the continued retention of the
GATT's incomplete remedies. 98 Bagwell and Staiger's theory adopts a
presumption that a breach will trigger immediate retaliatory consequences.
99
However, as already discussed, the WTO system does not empower harmed
states to suspend concessions immediately after a breach is discovered. They
do not directly address why states do not take advantage of the "free pass"
afforded by the system, nor why we should consider the presumption to apply
despite the remedies loophole.
Nevertheless, I suggest that the general insights from both streams of
scholarship are correct. My explanation builds off the insights of interest-based
theorists, but offers a more elaborate explanation of the mechanisms as
operationalized within the trade regime. In doing so, I provide an answer to
why the WTO has functioned relatively well to date, but suggest that this is
conditional on the exercise of power rather than necessarily reflective of the
93. Giovanni Maggi, The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade
Cooperation, 89 AM. ECON. REv. 190 (1999).
94. Goldsmith and Posner suggest a number of other conditions need also apply for continued
cooperation. These include: (1) whether the "tribunal makes decisions that consistently divide the
surplus rather than favoring one state to the extent that the other state receives higher payoffs by failing
to cooperate," and (2) whether "future payoffs and discount factors are high enough." In addition, the
benefits of cooperation must be superior to the alternatives of resolving the dispute through diplomatic
channels and through the creation of an ad hoc tribunal. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 14, at 153-
54.
95. BAGWELL & STAIGER, supra note 13, at 10 1-03.
96. Id. at 104-06.
97. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 14, at 152-57.
98. Id. at 158-60 (expressing skepticism that the WTO innovations change the overarching
dynamic, but noting a lack of conclusive evidence).
99. BAGWELL & STAIGER, supra note 13, at 101 ("When the domestic government cheats,
however, it triggers a retaliatory phase .... ).
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success of international judicialization.
A. Drawing on Conventional Interest-Based Theory and Analyzing Its
Limitations
I adopt the standard view of interest-based theorists that a state's behavior
is determined through a calculation of the relative payoffs of available policy
alternatives. Where the costs associated with temporary breach are greater than
the benefits, a state will find it in its interests to continue to comply with the
particular treaty obligation. In contrast, where the benefits outweigh the costs
and the relative payoff is greater than that associated with compliance, states
will choose to breach temporarily. 00 Whether a temporary breach transforms
into a longer-standing breach extending beyond the "reasonable period of time"
turns on a similar analysis that has been discussed extensively in the WTO
efficient breach literature. 10 1 Therefore, I confine the analysis to only the first
step in the decision process of whether a state should engage in a temporary
breach.
As I discuss below, current attempts to explain why the costs associated
with temporary breach are greater than the benefits are woefully incomplete.
The benefits side of the equation is clear. A temporary breach allows a segment
of domestic producers to capture, for a limited time, greater economic gains
relative to what it would obtain under conditions of continued compliance.
Domestic actors that interact with these domestic producers then capture
second-order benefits associated with the first-order gains. For example, if the
domestic producers' employment levels are relatively higher than what they
would otherwise be, labor groups stand to gain. Similarly, if the domestic
producers' purchases of inputs from upstream domestic suppliers are higher
than what they would otherwise be, upstream suppliers also gain. This pattern
then extends to third-order gains and beyond.
Balanced against these gains are a set of costs. Let us first consider the
economic costs. The withdrawal of certain WTO treaty obligations temporarily
results in increased costs for domestic consumers of the affected product. A
temporary breach of tariff concessions on luxury cars, for example, benefits
domestic producers of the product but hurts domestic consumers because it
raises the overall domestic market price. Again, the costs extend beyond the
immediate consumer. For example, if a temporary breach of tariff concessions
on steel results in higher overall prices for steel, this affects not only domestic
consumers of steel, but also downstream domestic producers that rely on
domestic inputs made of steel.
In addition to the economic costs and benefits are the related political
costs and benefits associated with a shift in trade policy. Often, when analyzing
100. This is not to suggest that all states are always able to accurately assess the true costs and
benefits associated with breach when making this choice. A state, for example, may miscalculate on
account of a misunderstanding, error, or incorrect speculation. States also operate under conditions of
uncertainty. In addition, states may also experience unexpected shocks.
101. See supra note 10.
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the net political effect, standard public choice theory comes into play. This
explains why the government may adopt certain policies that are not welfare-
maximizing for the country overall, but instead accommodate for protectionist
rent-seeking by interest groups.
Were the calculation of interests based solely on the economic and
political costs-and-benefits directly associated with the goods or services
affected by a temporary breach, then it is unlikely that the equilibrium point
reached would be one of thick compliance. A given state would find it to be in
its interest to engage in temporary breach of a particular set of trade
concessions. 102 The exact composition of temporary breaches would depend on
the country's particular resource endowment and its patterns of production,
consumption, and trade. However, especially when the prospect of
compensation or other forms of retrospective remedies does not exist, a state is
likely to find it "efficient" to breach temporarily in a certain number of
instances. Thus, the economic and political costs associated with the impacted
goods or services alone cannot explain the relative infrequency of temporary
breaches of WTO obligations. For the interest-based explanation to work
requires consideration of additional costs.
Three sets of additional costs feature prominently in the literature. The
first is that of reputation costs. 10 3 A state that is known to honor its
commitments acquires reputational collateral. Such collateral is valuable
because it increases the credibility of a state's promises and makes it easier to
achieve cooperation in future negotiations. In addition, a state's reputation
directly affects its soft power. In instances where a state chooses to breach its
treaty commitment, even if only temporarily, it incurs a cost to its reputation.
The exact amount turns on a variety of factors related to the nature of the
breach itself and the context in which it occurred.1
04
A second set of costs are litigation costs. A state can expect that for a
portion of its temporary breaches, its trading partners will initiate a WTO case
against it. Defending WTO litigation is costly as most countries rely on
external counsel for this task. To not do so, on the other hand, will shorten the
time period that one has to benefit from the illegal act. Thus, when calculating
the payoffs from a temporary breach and assessing how long such breach
should last, states must take into account litigation costs.
A third set of costs are transaction costs. If a state seeks to breach, but
only temporarily, then the government has to endure the costs of enacting
multiple policy changes at the domestic level-whether done through
102. For example, this might be the case in the luxury car example suggested above. If a state
were a major producer of a product for which a set of politically unorganized consumers were its major
consumers, and the product did not serve as a key input, then the state would find it to be in its interest
to engage in a temporary breach. Another example might be certain insurance or legal services.
103. See, e.g., GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 14, at 101-03; GUZMAN, supra note 87, at
34-45, 71-117.
104. See Andrew Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CALIF. L.
REV. 1823, 1861-65 (2002) (highlighting four factors affecting the calculation of the specific
reputational cost incurred).
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legislation, regulation, or executive order.105 Such costs vary depending on the
institutional structure of the state. In addition, the state also incurs costs at the
international level, in terms of diplomatic and bureaucratic resources expended
to explain its policy switches.
Costly policy pivots also highlight the potential for costs associated with
increased risk. While a government may intend for the WTO-illegal policy to
be temporary, there is the possibility that political opposition to pivoting back
to a treaty-compliant position will harden, such that the illegal act endures after
the expiration of the "reasonable period of time." Governments face the risk
that they may inadvertently trigger the retaliatory sanctions that they had
sought to avoid.
All this is to suggest that even if a temporary breach does not lead to a
suspension of trade concessions, it is not exactly cost-free. In understanding the
rational calculation facing states, these other costs matter. The conventional
account is that this tandem of costs is so high that the relative payoff of a
temporary breach is lower than that of continued compliance. Therefore, even
in the absence of the possibility of the WTO imposing any retaliatory costs for
a temporary breach, states self-regulate to ensure strong compliance with their
WTO treaty commitments.
Yet, the conventional account fails to offer a convincing explanation for
why we see the patterns of temporary breach that we do see. As noted earlier,
the United States and the European Union are the two parties against which the
most complaints have been filed with the WTO DSB. Yet, it is far from clear
that this is what the model would predict. How is it that the relative payoff of
temporary breach is greater for such states? Why would they face higher
benefits or lower costs for a temporary breach than their trading partners?
Of the cost factors emphasized by the conventional account, the one that
would best predict such an outcome is litigation costs. Because of their wealth,
the United States and the European Union would find the high litigation costs
to be less burdensome than a poorer country would. However, the advent of the
Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL), which offers discounted legal
services to developing countries, has helped to narrow this difference.1
06
Moreover, litigation costs fail to explain why the United States or the European
Union are more willing to be sued than other similarly wealthy countries (e.g.,
Singapore, Switzerland)-a difference that holds true even when adjustments
are made for the size of the economies.
The other cost factors lend even less predictive support for such an
outcome. When it comes to reputation costs, it is possible to spin a story in
105. For an elaboration of the specific nature of the transaction costs incurred in political
markets as applied to a rational choice model, see, for example, Douglass C. North, A Transaction Cost
Theory of Politics, 2 J. THEORETICAL POL. 355 (1990).
106. See Jan Bohanes & Femanda Garza, Going Beyond Stereotypes: Participation of
Developing Countries in WTO Dispute Settlement, 4 TRADE L. & DEV. 45, 72-75 (2012) (discussing
how the ACWL provides services at deeply discounted rates and why its rates do not serve as a barrier
to a country's willingness to bring a complaint).
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which the United States and the European Union may have fewer reasons to
care about their reputations. Given the size of their markets, their policynakers
might believe that trading partners will be keen to cooperate with them
regardless of whether their treaty promises are perceived to be credible. But
this narrative does not square with actual facts. In reality, the United States and
the European Union both emphasize the importance of soft power and appear
to care about their reputations in the global arena. 107 By contrast, other
countries that have cultivated a reputation for willingness to defy the system in
other realms of the international economic order (e.g., Argentina, Venezuela)
have not been keen to exploit the remedies loophole.
Likewise, on the issue of transaction costs, one would expect that such
costs are higher in countries with deliberative democracies and complex
bureaucracies. Thus, one might expect them to be more hesitant to engage in a
temporary breach. Yet, precisely the opposite is true. As noted earlier, the vast
majority of temporary breaches are in democracies. One might posit that this is
because the higher transaction costs are more than offset by the higher political
gains that governments in democracies receive from a particular temporary
breach relative to authoritarian governments. Even so, still left unresolved is
the question of why among democracies, the United States and the European
Union take advantage of the temporary breach loophole much more than other
democratic WTO members (such as India or Mexico).
Therefore, the conventional account of the exact mechanics at work leave
something more to be desired. When it comes to explaining the temporary
breach puzzle, it may well be the case that the WTO system of imperfect
remedies is not exploited frequently because the relative payoffs of temporary
breach are lower than those associated with continued compliance in most
instances. But the account given to date fails to deliver a convincing analysis of
precisely how and why this is the case.
B. Towards a Revised and Elaborated Theory
I argue that two important elements that underlie the WTO legal system
are missing from the conventional account. First, power asymmetries play an
important role in determining both the substance of the law and the nature of
relationships among the actors within the system. Second, the WTO
agreements are not static treaties. Rather, the WTO system has an in-built
dynamic for the continued evolution of trade concessions among dyads or a
limited subset of its members. The interactions between these two elements
107, See Michael Smith, Between Two Worlds? The European Union, the United States and
World Order, 41 INT'L POL. 95, 106 (2004) (characterizing "the approach of the Europeans to world
order issues" as one in which most EU member states have "an addiction to 'soft power'); Ernest J.
Wilson Im, Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power, 616 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 110, 111
(2008) ("As we look toward the future, soft power calculations should figure far more prominently in
the design of American national security and foreign policies."); see generally Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft
Power and European-American Affairs, in HARD POWER, SOFT POWER AND THE FUTURE OF
TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS 25, 25-34 (Thomas L. lgen ed., 2006) (contrasting European and
American soft power).
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work to create additional costs associated with a temporary breach that have
been overlooked in the conventional account. The nature of these costs,
however, differs depending on the type of state concerned. Below, I first
explain the overall interaction between these two elements. I then elaborate on
the specific costs faced by different categories of states.
Let us first briefly discuss the element of power. Within interest-based
approaches to analyzing treaty compliance, power consistently has played an
important role. 1 08 My argument here is that the WTO context is no different. At
first glance, it may appear the WTO agreements (specifically, Article 23 of the
DSU) require countries to sign away their right to resort to raw power to
enforce trade treaties in favor of judicial recourse through the WTO DSB. °9
Article 23 also requires that WTO members refrain from retaliation through the
suspension of trade concessions unless WTO judicial proceedings have
concluded and the DSB has granted authorization. Nevertheless, despite these
limitations, power-and more specifically, power asymmetries among WTO
members-continues to play a key role in the enforcement of WTO law.
What do I mean by power? Power takes on a variety of forms. 110 Here, I
am concerned primarily with economic power, and specifically that associated
with a state's market power. To a more limited extent, military power may also
factor into the equation. Within the membership body of the WTO, economic
power has been, and continues to be, dispersed asymmetrically. The same is
true also of military power.
To understand why power asymmetries continue to matter requires that I
draw in the second element of the WTO law that has been frequently
overlooked by general international law scholars when discussing the WTO
regime. Much attention has been devoted to the general exceptions of GATT
Article XX and GATS Article XIV. 111 However, considerably less attention has
been paid to the exceptions of GATT Article XXIV and GATS Article V or the
Enabling Clause. 12 These provisions are equally important, for they highlight
that the WTO agreements do more than set reciprocal trade concessions among
108. The importance of power in contemporary debates dates back to Hans Morgenthau who
wrote that international law should "be seen within the sociological context of economic interests, social
tensions, and aspirations for power, which are the motivating forces in the international field .... Hans
J. Morgenthau, Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law, 34 AM. J. INT'L L. 260, 269 (1940).
For more recent discussions, see, for example, Richard H. Steinberg & Jonathan M. Zasloff, Power and
International Law, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 64 (2006); and William W. Burke-White, Power Shifts in
International Law: Structural Realignment and Substantive Pluralism, 56 HARV. J. INT'L L.
(forthcoming 2015), http://ssm.com/abstract-=-2378912.
109. DSU art. 23.2.
110. See generally JOSEPH NYE, THE FUTURE OF POWER (2012) (describing military,
economic, and soft power and their importance for continued American geopolitical influence in the
twenty-first century).
111. GATT, supra note 22, art. XX; General Agreement on Trade in Services art. XIV, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S.
183 (1995) [hereinafter GATS].
112. GATT, supra note 22, art. XXIV; GATS, supra note 111, art. V; Differential and More
Favourable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, L14903, Nov. 28,
1979, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 203 (1980).
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states. The treaties also provide a framework for gradual continued trade
liberalization. In other words, the WTO regime is not static, but dynamic and
evolving. Or as economists would characterize it, trade agreements are
incomplete and endogenous.1 3 While the current multilateral treaty may fix the
terms of trade between multiple pairs of trading partners, it also allows for the
terms of trade for a given pair to evolve toward expanded trade liberalization-
without requiring necessarily that the expanded terms be granted to other
trading partners.
More specifically, the WTO legal system should be conceptualized as
consisting of three different forms of legal obligations:
At its core are a set of reciprocal concessions that must be extended to all
WTO members according to a most-favored-nation (MFN) principle. Such
concessions are negotiated at the multilateral level. They can be updated over
successive negotiating rounds, but only very limited updating has occurred
since the Uruguay Round concluded in 1994.
In addition, the system permits WTO members to make additional
reciprocal concessions with trading partners that liberalize trade beyond what is
required at the multilateral level. These concessions often take the form of
PTAs, of which more than 400 have been concluded and which vary in terms
of their level of integration. 1 4 GATT Article XXIV and GATS Article V
establish a set of requirements that must be fulfilled in order for an agreement
between two or more WTO members to qualify as a PTA. The most significant
among these is a requirement that the PTA must result in liberalization of
"substantially all" trade. 1 5 With the impasse in the Doha Round, at present,
PTAs are the main focus of ongoing trade negotiations by the major countries.
Finally, the system also permits WTO members to make additional
unilateral concessions in favor of liberalization for certain trading partners that
are developing countries. These concessions do not necessarily take the form of
treaties; they may instead be captured in administrative decrees and/or
domestic legislation. Today, several countries grant such concessions, most
commonly through a Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program. A
WTO member is allowed to set the breadth of its GSP program, both in terms
of the scope of the covered products to which preferences are given and the
scope of countries. However, this cannot be done arbitrarily. In EC-Tariff
Preferences, the Appellate Body established that any difference in the level of
preference given to similarly-situated developing countries must be done on the
basis of "objective criteria."' 16
113. See Henrik Horn, Giovanni Maggi & Robert Staiger, Trade Agreements as Endogenously
Incomplete Contracts, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 394 (2010).
114. They may also take the form ofplurilateral agreements concluded under the auspices of
the WTO (e.g., Information Technology Agreement) or outside of the WTO (the ongoing Trade in
Services Agreement).
115. GATT, supra note 22, art. XX1V. The corresponding obligation in the GATS is that
"substantially all discrimination" must be eliminated for those sectors specified in an agreement with
"substantial sector coverage." GATS, supra note 111, art. V.
116. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Conditions for the Granting of Tariff
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One can conceive of the first form of obligations as a general MFN
obligation binding upon all WTO members, for which the second and third
forms serve as optional exceptions to the MFN rule. In other words, states have
a choice as to whether they wish to engage in PTAs or unilateral trade
concessions. Only the first form of legal obligations is required; the other two
are optional.
Now, let us bring these elements together. In a regime where treaty terms
are not fixed but can evolve, power asymmetries matter greatly. To understand
why, consider each of the three forms of WTO legal obligations once more.
First, the substance of the core MFN provisions is reflective of the power
asymmetries existent at the time the WTO agreements were drafted.11 7 As
Richard Steinberg has observed, "GATT/WTO decision-making rules have
allowed adherence to both the instrumental reality of asymmetrical power and
the logic of appropriateness of sovereign equality. Trade rounds may be
launched by law-based bargaining, but powerful states have dominated agenda
setting, and rounds have been concluded in the shadow of power."1 8 Even with
a consensus decision-making rule, the legal substance of WTO law is reflective
of the dominant interests of the powerful states in the Uruguay Round-
specifically, the United States and the European Communities. 
119
Power asymmetries also come into play when considering the second
form of reciprocal concessions, PTAs. When it comes to potential PTA
partners, not all countries are equal. A PTA concluded with a country with a
large internal market and sizeable consumer base for one's exports is much
more valuable than a PTA with a smaller, poorer country. Powerful states are
therefore in a stronger position to decide with whom they wish to engage in
additional non-MFN trade liberalization and on what terms.
Finally, with respect to the additional unilateral trade concessions, these
are essentially one-sided preferences granted by a more powerful state (i.e.,
generally a developed country) to less powerful ones (i.e., developing countries
and/or Least Developed Countries (LDCs)). Powerful states are again placed in
a stronger position because each singularly sets the criteria that it will employ
to decide which of its trading partners qualify for the additional trade
Preferences to Developing Countries, 1183, WT/DS246/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2004) [hereinafter EC-Tariff
Preferences AB Report].
117. Power asymmetries may also indirectly affect the substance of WTO law through
interpretation of treaty provisions. While the DSU does not formally specify the composition of the
Appellate Body, in practice, major trading powers have tended to secure seats for their nominees.
Whether this result, in turn, affects interpretation of particular provisions in favor of the interests of
established powers is debatable. However, as this element is not critical to my theory, I do not elaborate
upon it in this Article.
118. Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and
Outcomes in the GA7T/WTO, 56 INT'L ORG. 339, 365 (2002) (citing James G. March & Johan P. Olsen,
The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders, 52 INT'L ORG. 943 (1998)).
119. See id. at 342, 346-49, 365-66 (describing how the GATT/WTO operates under an
"invisible weighting" of power and concluding that the GATT/WTO's consensus decision-making
process is "organized hypocrisy in the procedural context"). Note that the European Communities is the
predecessor to the European Union which was in existence at the time of the Uruguay Round's
conclusion in 1994.
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concessions. 120 If a less powerful state wishes to obtain trading terms that are
more favorable than the MFN terms, it again is subject to the grace of the more
powerful state.
Therefore, power asymmetries affect not only the substance of existing
WTO law but also the ongoing interactions between trading partners. A state's
obligations are consistently evolving in light of developments in multilateral
negotiations, PTA negotiations, and unilateral trade preferences-all of which
take place in the shadow of power.
In this context, my argument is that different types of states run the risk
of incurring different forms of additional costs when they engage in a
temporary breach. For explication purposes, I identify four categories of WTO
members: (1) typical developing and LDCs; (2) emerging powers in the
developing world; (3) small and medium-sized advanced economies; and (4)
large advanced economies. Understanding the nature of these additional costs
for each category of states, I suggest, is the key to resolving the temporary
breach puzzle of WTO law.
1. Developing and Least-Developed Countries
The vast majority of the WTO's member states are developing countries.
I group all but the large emerging powers together into a single category. While
I recognize the heterogeneity of the group, I do so because coercive power is at
the heart of understanding why all these countries do not abuse the WTO "free
pass" to engage in temporary breaches.
Coercive power is derived from raw power asymmetries. The asymmetry
here stems from the fact that countries in this category fird it much more
important to gain access to the markets of certain key developed economies
than vice versa. For example, Cambodia finds trade with the United States or
Japan to be much more critical than vice versa. Importantly, in this context, the
optional nature of the MFN exceptions provides large advanced economies
with much greater leverage, or coercive power, over most developing
countries.
How exactly does coercive power come into play with respect to a
temporary breach? Doesn't the DSU level the playing field by requiring that all
states-big and small-turn to the WTO to adjudicate an allegation of breach?
Specifically, Article 23.2 of the DSU requires states to refrain from suspending
trade concessions or other obligations until after it succeeds in WTO litigation
and the respondent has shown itself unwilling to comply with the judgment
within a "reasonable period of time." In light of this provision, aren't all WTO
members obliged to allow each other to take advantage of the "free pass"? How
is it that power politics remains relevant?
120. As noted earlier, such criteria cannot be set arbitrarily. The Appellate Body has decreed
that "preference-granting countries are required, by virtue of the term 'non-discriminatory,' to ensure
that identical treatment is available to all similarly-situated GSP beneficiaries, that is, to all GSP
beneficiaries that have the 'development, financial, and trade needs' to which the treatment in question
is intended to respond." EC-TariffPreferences AB Report, supra note 116, 173.
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If one examines closely the language of Article 23 of the DSU, the
limitation on suspension of concessions or other obligations applies only to
those "under the covered agreements." 121 In other words, the restriction is only
with respect to the withdrawal of MFN obligations provided through the
multilateral agreements (i.e., the first type of legal obligations discussed
earlier). It does not extend to concessions or other obligations that arise outside
of this context (i.e., the other two types of legal obligations discussed earlier).
Therefore, despite the apparent limitations of Article 23 of the DSU, advanced
economies have several means to retaliate against a developing country that
engages in a temporary breach without first bringing a case before the WTO.
Consider first a scenario whereby the developing country is the
beneficiary of preferential trade concessions through a GSP program. At
present, 127 countries are beneficiaries of the various European GSP
programs. The last incarnation of the U.S. GSP program similarly covered
129 countries.1 Other countries that offer trade preference programs for
developing countries include Japan, Canada, Australia, and Switzerland. If the
beneficiary of such a program engages in a temporary breach that negatively
impacts producers of a country that grants preferences, its trading partner can
retaliate immediately by suspending the preferential trade concessions. It need
not wait until the conclusion of WTO litigation to do so.
Therefore, for the vast majority of developing countries that benefit from
a GSP or other trade preference program, there is no true "free pass." A breach,
even if temporary and remedied before the end of the "reasonable period of
time," can result in the suspension of trade concessions, albeit only of a
preferential, and not MFN, form.
Do countries go so far as to actually cut off trade preferences for
developing countries? The answer is yes, albeit not all that often. For example,
in June 2013, the United States suspended GSP preferences for Bangladesh.
124
The European Union similarly withdrew GSP preferences for Sri Lanka in
February 2010125 and Belarus in June 2007.126 What is interesting about all of
121. DSUart.23.
122. EUROPEAN COMM'N, THE EU's NEW GENERALISED SCHEME OF PREFERENCES 13-14
(2013) (identifying 111 beneficiaries of the general arrangement and 16 beneficiaries of the GSP-
arrangement).
123. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, U.S. GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF
PREFERENCES (GSP) GUIDEBOOK 17-19 (2012). Note that the U.S. program currently has not been
reauthorized by Congress, but in the past, when this situation has arisen, Congressional reauthorization
has been made retroactive.
124. Stephanie Clifford, Obama to Suspend Trade Privileges with Bangladesh, N.Y. TIMES,
June 27, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/28/business/us-to-suspend-trade-privileges-with
-bangladesh-officials-say.html.
125. Implementing Regulation No. 143/2010, of the Council of 15 February 2010 Temporarily
Withdrawing the Special Incentive Arrangement for Sustainable Development and Good Governance
Provided For Under Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 with Respect to the Democratic Socialist Republic of
Sri Lanka, 2010 O.J. (L 45) 1.
126. Press Release, European Commission, EU Will Withdraw GSP Trade Preferences from
Belarus over Workers' Rights Violations (June 18, 2007), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP-07
-844 en.htm. For a more comprehensive discussion of EU withdrawal of GSP benefits, see CLARA
PORTELA, EUROPEAN UNION SANCTIONS AND FOREIGN POLICY: WHEN AND WHY Do THEY WORK 148-
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these cases is that the trigger events were trade-related but did not amount to a
clear violation of WTO law. The fact that large powers are willing to take this
dramatic step, even when WTO law is not directly violated, provides an
important signal to trading partners of its resolve to use such preferences as
leverage to advance trade interests.
When it comes to explicit violations of WTO law, an advanced economy
usually has not had to go so far as to actually suspend preferential concessions.
More often the path employed is simply to threaten to cut off such preferences
in order to induce a change in behavior. For example, in 1999, the United
States raised a number of concerns with Moldova over whether its intellectual
property laws were in line with its WTO commitments, in response to an
industry petition to revoke Moldova's GSP benefits.' 27 Faced with this threat,
Moldova addressed the issues of concern within months, leaving American
industry officials satisfied that any potential breach was corrected.
128
The Moldova example above is not unique. To name a few other
examples, the United States has also used GSP as leverage to induce Ukraine to
strengthen its enforcement against intellectual property piracy, the Philippines
to provide access to American pork products, and several countries to improve
workers' rights. 129 These represent those instances where a country has chosen
to make its threat public. More often than not, the threatened cut-off of
preferential concessions is made in private between diplomats. By keeping the
nature of the threats private, government officials on both sides retain greater
flexibility when explaining their actions to affected domestic constituents,
while minimizing the cost to bilateral relations.
In all, just the possibility of a revocation of preferential benefits in
response to a breach produces a powerful chilling effect on the behavior of
developing countries. Developing countries that are reliant on GSP to gain
preferential access to key export markets must act carefully so as to not upset
those trading partners, lest they find their preferences eliminated.
Consider now a second scenario in which a developing country gains
preferential trade concessions through a PTA rather than a GSP program.
Again, should this country engage in a temporary breach, the existence of
additional non-MFN trade preferences provides its trading partner with a means
61(2010).
127. Letter from Eric Smith, President, Int'l Intellectual Prop. Alliance, to GSP Subcommittee,
Office of the U.S. Trade Rep. (June 16, 1999), http://www.iipa.com/gsp/1999_Jun16_cmts
moldova.html.
128. Letter from Eric Schwartz, Counsel, Int'l Intellectual Prop. Alliance, to Jon Rosenbaum,
Office of the U.S. Trade Rep. (Oct. 23, 2000), http://www.iipa.com/gsp/2000_Oct23_GSP
_Moldova.pdf.
129. For other examples and a more in-depth discussion of U.S. GSP conditionality, see, for
example, U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-R09, U.S. TRADE PREFERENCE PROGRAMS:
AN OVERVIEW OF USE BY BENEFICIARIES AND U.S. ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEWS (2007); and Emily
Blanchard & Shushanik Hakobyan, The US. Generalized System of Preferences in Principle and
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to retaliate immediately in line with WTO rules. If the PTA has not yet been
ratified, the affected country can threaten to withhold ratification in light of the
temporary breach. If it has already been ratified, the affected country still has
several options. The most extreme would be to threaten withdrawal from the
PTA altogether. If the PTA calls for subsequent negotiations of the tariff
reduction schedule, then a less extreme option would be to hold up such
negotiations in light of the breach. Depending on the terms of the PTA and a
country's willingness to violate PTA (but not WTO) terms, it might also
consider withdrawing certain PTA trade preferences. Again, a country may not
have to even go this far. A threat, so long as it is credible, may induce the
necessary chilling effect.
Even if a large developed country does not have a PTA with the violating
country, it can use the prospect of a future PTA as a point of leverage. The
large advanced economy simply signals to a country that is considering
engaging in a temporary breach that such behavior will impair its chances of
being invited to negotiate a future PTA. Such signaling is likely to produce a
chilling effect on the behavior of any developing country hoping to benefit
from a PTA with a large developed country. Interestingly, this type of effect is
likely to have the greatest impact on wealthier developing countries, which
may have graduated from GSP programs and are now engaged in a competition
with one another to conclude PTAs with the large developed countries that are
their key export markets. This is particularly true if their exports are facing
pressure from lower-wage competitors in China and elsewhere.
Large developed countries have not hesitated to use PTAs as points of
leverage with developing countries. Before even agreeing to enter into
negotiations, the United States will often require that a potential PTA partner
adopt programs designed to address U.S. trade concerns. For example, prior to
beginning PTA negotiations with Thailand in 2004, the United States required
that Thailand establish a joint work program to address intellectual property,
regulatory issues affecting investment, and technology policies.130 More
recently, the United States has asked the same of Vietnam, before agreeing to
its inclusion in the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations. The scope of issues
to be addressed in the joint U.S.-Vietnam work program is even broader;
besides intellectual property and investment, it also includes technical
regulations, services, food standards, and labor rights.
131
Both the United States and the European Union have made clear that
behavior deemed problematic can slow down the tempo of PTA negotiations,
and in some instances, even lead to their suspension. For example, the EU-
India negotiations made tremendous headway in 2012, but ground to a halt in
130. Trade and Investment Framework Agreement Between the United States of America and
the Kingdom of Thailand, U.S.-Thai., Annex, Oct. 23, 2002, http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/US
--Thailand%20TIFA.pdf.
131. Trade and Investment Framework Agreement Between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, U.S.-Viet., Annex, June 21,
2007, http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/tifa/asset-upload-file8l-12935.pdf.
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2013 as differences emerged in intellectual property, and in particular, India's
use of compulsory licenses and patent revocations against European drugs. 132
Similarly, the U.S.-Thailand negotiations were halted in 2006, ostensibly in
response to the Thai military coup. 133 However, bilateral tensions over
Thailand's intellectual property policies also played a key role.' 34 Again, the
American and European actions were taken in response to trade policies that
did not amount to an overt violation of WTO law. The fact that they acted
under less dramatic instances signaled credible resolve of their willingness to
use PTAs against temporary breaches that harm their interests.
As was true of the GSP examples, just the possibility that a breach would
impact the potential for a PTA produces a powerful chilling effect on the
behavior of those developing countries interested in a PTA. Even if temporary
breaches avoid formal sanctions, they still come with the cost of foregoing
potential PTA-related benefits.
For developing countries, the MFN exceptions within the WTO regime
operate as a double-edged sword. On the one hand, they provide a legal means
for developing countries to secure unilateral trade preferences from developed
countries. On the other hand, because developed countries can attach trade-
related criteria to these preferences, they also provide developed countries with
greater retaliatory power against temporary breaches committed by developing
countries.
Beyond the points of leverage provided by the MFN exceptions in the
WTO regime itself, power asymmetries between developed and developing
countries also exist in other realms. Developed countries can also attempt to
link such elements (e.g., foreign aid, security, technical assistance, etc.) if
necessary in order to further bolster their coercive power. In short, developed
countries have sufficient means to declare credibly to developing countries:
follow your treaty commitments, and we will reward you; breach, and we will
punish you.
Therefore, for the vast majority of the WTO's 160 members that are
developing countries, temporary breaches are not worthwhile even if the
system does not provide for retrospective damages. But this is not necessarily
due to concerns over reputation, litigation, or transaction costs. At the heart of
the equation is still the issue of retaliatory costs. For most developing countries,
certain developed countries hold sufficient leverage over them. They can raise,
legally, the costs of a temporary breach such that the costs outweigh the
132. For a discussion of how intellectual property protection and access to generic medicines is
a key issue in the ongoing PTA negotiations, see Jan Wouters et al., Some Critical Issues in EU-India
Free Trade Agreement Negotiations 10-12 (Leuven Ctr. for Global Governance Studies Working Paper
No. 102, Feb. 2013), http://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/publications/workingpapers/new-series/wplO1
- 110/wp 102-wouters-goddeeris-natens.pdf.
133. See EMMA CHANLETr-AVERY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32593, THAILAND:
BACKGROUND AND U.S. RELATIONS 13-14 (2008).
134. See Jerome Reichman, Comment, Compulsory Licensing of Patented Pharmaceutical
Inventions: Evaluating the Options, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 247, 258-59 (2009) (noting the extent of
U.S. reprisals against Thailand). Note that PTA negotiations did not resume even after democracy was
restored in 2007, nor after the party originally spearheading the PTA was returned to power in 2011.
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benefits. Moreover, because they can do so immediately, the growing time
required for WTO dispute settlement is immaterial to their decision.
Consequently, the rational behavior for this set of countries is to engage in
thick cooperation rather than try to take advantage of the WTO's imperfect
remedies.
The theory above is designed to explain why developing countries do not
attempt to take advantage of the WTO's incomplete remedy most of the time. I
do not mean to suggest that coercive power ensures that developing countries
will never breach. Under certain conditions, governments facing domestic
protectionist pressures will acquiesce, preferring to rely on WTO litigation or
an explicit demonstration of coercive force by a foreign power to force a policy
change rather than expending political capital to overcome domestic
opposition.
Nor do I mean to suggest that developed countries will always seek to
resort to power to dissuade or end a temporary breach, even if they have the
means and leverage to do so. Instead, at times, they may choose to file a WTO
case instead. This begs the related question of what work the WTO DSB is
doing if the key enforcement device is power. Why do powerful countries
bother with the DSB? Put differently, what difference would it make if the
DSB disappeared tomorrow?
Even for powerful states vis-a-vis developing countries, the DSB serves a
valuable role. It enhances the set of options available for securing compliance
with ongoing law. A powerful country always has the option of resorting to
power, whether through GSP, PTAs, or other mechanisms. But the presence of
the DSB offers it another alternative. It can willfully choose to accept the
additional harms of a temporary breach for a fixed period in exchange for
sanctioning pressure that arises from a judicial process rather than a crude
threat. Under some circumstances, a powerful country may consider this trade-
off worthwhile; at other times, it may not. The key point is that the DSB
provides the powerful with more options, which, I suggest, is itself valuable.
When might developed countries prefer to use WTO litigation to compel
change rather than turn to more blunt forms of coercive power? One example is
when a trade dispute arises between two countries with sensitive bilateral
relations. For example, if the breaching country is a key ally, one might be
hesitant to apply direct coercive power out of fear that it would antagonize
one's friends. Similarly, if the dispute is between two countries seeking
rapprochement, there may be a fear that a deployment of coercive force would
destroy any carefully crafted forward momentum. The option of resorting to
WTO litigation therefore offers a means to compartmentalize the dispute
through judicialization without jeopardizing the other elements of the
relationship.
Another example is when the breach arises due to domestic tensions
between pro-protectionist and pro-liberalization political factions. The explicit
threat of coercive force by a foreign power may strengthen the hand of the
protectionists, who will appeal to nationalism to rally the populace to remain
firm. Coercive force therefore could weaken pro-liberalization reformers,
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whose long-term success the developed power hopes to cultivate. Wishing to
avoid such a dynamic, the developed power may decide again that it is better to
resort to litigation, even if it means bearing the short-term cost of the temporary
breach. In other words, a country may choose to litigate if it increases the odds
that power within the domestic political economy will shift toward those more
favorable toward its interests.
Therefore, we see several new WTO cases each year by developed
countries against developing countries. Even if power can be effectively
deployed to end a breach, it does not necessarily suggest that coercive force is
necessarily always the first-best option. The DSB provides an additional
alternative that developed countries may find to be more attractive to exercise
under certain circumstances, albeit with the cost of enduring a longer
temporary breach.
The proposed theory therefore helps to explain the disparity in the
frequency of temporary breach between developed and developing countries. It
also resolves the larger question of why, when facing WTO laws viewed as
disadvantageous to their economies, developing countries simply do not ignore
these laws until a WTO ruling compels them to do so. Although they could
reap temporary gains from breach because the system does not impose
retrospective remedies, the threat of coercive power provides for the possibility
that such gains will be less than the costs to be paid through the loss of
preferential tariffs, the possibility of a PTA, or other non-trade benefits. Thus,
governments in developing countries self-regulate to keep temporary breaches
in check, even when WTO law does not formally ensure a remedy for such
breaches.
Two quick caveats. First, the explanation that I have sketched out above
emphasizes power asymmetries and the greater coercive power to which
developing countries are subject. I stress these elements because their role in
explaining the puzzle of why the WTO dispute settlement process functions
effectively despite imperfect remedies has been underappreciated in the
literature. Nevertheless, I fully recognize that there may be a domestic political
economy story that complements this explanation. Some governments,
especially in developing countries, have used WTO commitments as a means to
enact domestic economic reforms through external treaty lock-in. Such
governments would have an additional incentive to not undertake temporary
breaches for this would undercut their own domestic agenda, at least in the
early stages when this agenda is just taking hold. This domestic political
economy rationale may be much more important than external coercion in
some instances. But because it does not hold true across the board, we need a
more comprehensive explanation for why we see thick cooperation in
developing countries of all forms.
Second, and relatedly, I do not mean to suggest that other forces are not at
work. It is possible that a particular developing country may have certain
interests in preserving the WTO as a stable legal system. After all, the DSB is
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one of the few international legal systems offering weaker states recourse
against more powerful states that fail to comply with a judgment. 35 I am
contending that the mechanisms associated with power asymmetries are the
strongest force at work in explaining the temporary breach puzzle for
developing countries. But it is not necessarily the only one, because countries
respond to various kinds of incentives as well.
2. Emerging Economies
What about the largest of the developing countries? Does the narrative
above hold true for the major emerging economies-the so-called BRICS (i.e.,
Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) as well as the other large
developing countries (e.g., Indonesia, Turkey, Mexico)? Or does their size
render them immune to attempts by the established trading powers to coerce
them to comply with their WTO obligations and refrain from temporary
breaches? The answer is that it simply depends on the country.
Despite their size, a number of these countries remain beholden to the
trade preferences granted by advanced economies. For example, Brazil, India,
Indonesia, Russia, South Africa, and Turkey all qualify for the U.S. GSP
program. 136 China is the lone exception. Until 2014, all these major emerging
economies qualified for some form of European trade preference.137 For some
countries, the value of GSP is significant. For example, the European Union
represents India's largest export market and the third-largest export market for
Indonesia.138 According to EU estimates, more than half of India's exports are
to the European Union and nearly thirty percent of Indonesia's exports benefit
from preferential tariff rates.' 39 South Africa has been a primary beneficiary of
U.S. preferences granted under the African Growth and Opportunity Act.
40
The situation for this set of countries is not that different than that of other
developing countries. The large advanced economies retain significant leverage
over these countries through their trade preference programs.
Turkey and Mexico fall into their own unique category. Each country has
135. See DSU arts. 21-22.
136. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 123, at 18.
137. See Regulation No. 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25
October 2012 Applying a Scheme of Generalised Tariff Preferences and Repealing Council Regulation
(EC) No. 732/2008, 2012 O.J. (L303). Under the newly-revised European program, Brazil no longer
qualifies for GSP benefits, and several preferences for China have been eliminated.
138. Author's calculations based on information available in U.N. Comtrade database for
2012. See Dep't of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, supra note 77.
139. Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment Annexes Accompanying the
Document Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Applying a
Scheme of Generalised Trade Preferences, at 13, COM (2011) 241 final, SEC (2011) 537 final (May 10,
2011) [hereinafter Commission Staff Working Document].
140. Stephen Hayes, What We Know and Don't Know About Trade with Africa, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Nov. 18, 2013, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/11/18/a-new
-report-could-give-a-clearer-picture-of-us-trade-with-africa; see also Written Response of the Minister of
International Relations and Cooperation to Question Paper No. 7-2013, DEP'T OF INT'L RELATIONS &
COOPERATION (Aug. 21, 2011), http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/2013pq/pq232.html (highlighting
that without AGOA, South Africa would run a large trade deficit with the United States).
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a shared border and an asymmetrical power relationship with its major trading
partner. 141 Maintaining a PTA with this partner is critical to its economy. This
dynamic allows its partner and its allies to maintain leverage over both Turkey
and Mexico to dissuade temporary breaches, albeit through a different
mechanism than that of a GSP program.
This leaves China, Russia, and Brazil. Although all three countries still
benefit from a trade preference program, these benefits are not significant. Nor
do any hold realistic aspirations of entering into a PTA anytime soon with the
United States or European Union. As I will elaborate upon in Part III, both
China and Russia therefore pose certain challenges, at least with respect to
temporary breaches of WTO obligations. For the moment, this is not the case
with Brazil, for reasons less to do with power than with reputation. Brazil
campaigned hard and successfully for its former WTO Ambassador, Roberto
Azevedo, to become the Director-General of the WTO. With a Brazilian
currently heading the WTO, for the time being at least, Brazil is likely to
refrain from taking steps that would undermine the organization's, and its own,
reputations.
Therefore, there is no singular answer for why emerging powers do not
engage in temporary breaches of WTO law more frequently. The group is
relatively heterogeneous when it comes to the costs and benefits that each
country faces. However, for the moment, several of the large emerging
economies continue to face an additional set of economic costs related to their
continued asymmetrical power relationship vis-A-vis developed countries. Like
the costs faced by their smaller developing country counterparts, such costs
serve to rein in any temptation to breach temporarily. But as I will discuss in
Part III, this may no longer be true of China or Russia.
3. Small and Medium-Sized Advanced Economies
What about developed countries? If they benefit from asymmetries in
economic power, why do they not take advantage of the remedies loophole to
engage in temporary breaches with impunity?
For a subset of small developed countries (e.g., New Zealand, Singapore),
their economies are heavily dependent on trade with others. Although they do
not benefit from GSP and other preferences for developing countries, they
partake actively in a PTA-oriented strategy in order to secure preferential
tariffs in key markets. Moreover, they are disproportionately likely to depend
on other developed countries in other non-trade areas (e.g., security). Thus, the
coercive power explanation discussed above also applies to this subset.
A similar dynamic holds true for several of the medium-sized advanced
economies. For example, consider the case of South Korea. Its economy grew
141. The Turkey-EU Customs Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement illustrate
this dynamic. See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.
289 (1993); Decision No. 1/95 of the EC-Turkey Association Council of 22 December 1995 on
Implementing the Final Phase of the Customs Union, 1996 O.J. (L 35) (implementing the Turkey-EU
Customs Union).
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spectacularly in the 1980s, during a time when, as a developing country, it still
qualified for GSP programs in key export markets. In 1989, the United States
decided to withdraw GSP benefits. The formal reason given was South Korea's
rapid economic growth, but others have noted that U.S. frustration with policies
restricting access for American producers may have also played a role. 142 For a
period in the 1990s, South Korea, without GSP, found itself less inclined to
restrain temporary breaches simply to preserve preferential trade benefits.
1 43
But as Korean firms moved up the global production value chain, South Korea
then shifted to a strategy of seeking PTAs with its key export markets.144 By
lowering tariffs, PTAs afford Korean exporters an important cost advantage
over their competitors (e.g., Japanese and Taiwanese firms). A coercive power
dynamic then reemerged. Even as it has grown wealthy and become a member
of the OECD, South Korea still needs to cultivate favorable economic relations
with the major advanced trading powers with whom it seeks PTAs. Hence, it
has followed its WTO commitments squarely; only one complaint has been
raised by a developed country against Korea since 2002, which was eventually
settled. 
14
Therefore, for most small and medium-sized advanced economies, power
asymmetries-on account of a desire for PTAs and/or linkages to other issues
(e.g., security)-continue to explain why such countries have not exploited the
remedies loopholes in WTO law. If such a country did exploit the loopholes, its
more powerful trading partners have sufficient leverage to generate costly
consequences, even prior to the conclusion of WTO litigation. Again, a true
"free pass" does not exist.
In addition, the caveats noted above for developing countries continue to
apply for this group. I am simply suggesting that the costs associated with
power asymmetries-particularly when exercised with PTAs-are the
strongest force in play for this group. But this is not to rule out the possibility
of other systemic interests or domestic political factors at work. In other words,
I am arguing that the mechanisms described above play a key role in explaining
why we do not observe frequent temporary breaches from this group of states,
142. Jay S. Newman, Korea and the American Generalized System of Preferences: Was
Graduation a Proper Response?, I I U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 687, 696-98 (1990).
143. This coincides with a period in which several WTO cases were brought against South
Korea. Chronological List of Disputes Cases, supra note 70.
144. See, e.g., Free Trade Agreement Between the European Union and Its Member States, of
the One Part, and the Republic of Korea, of the Other Part, EU-S. Kor., May 14, 2011, reprinted in,
2011 O.J. (L 127) 6; Free Trade Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of
Korea, U.S.-S. Kor., June 30, 2007, modified, Feb. 10, 2011, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free
-trade-agreements/korus-fta/final-text; see also South Korea, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu
/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/south-korea (last visited Dec. 4, 2014) (describing the EU-
Korea trade relationship);
145. See Request for Consultations by Canada, Korea-Measures Affecting the Importation of
Bovine Meat and Meat Products from Canada, WT/DS391/l (Apr. 15, 2009); Notification of a
Mutually-Agreed Solution, Korea-Measures Affecting the Importation of Bovine Meat and Meat
Products from Canada, WT/DS391/9 (June 21, 2012). Prior to that case, the last complaint was Korea-
Commercial Vessels, filed by the European Communities in October 2002. See Request for
Consultations by the European Communities, Korea-Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels,
WT/DS273/1 (Oct. 24, 2002).
2015]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
but I am not suggesting that power is the only factor at work.
4. Large Advanced Economies
This leaves a small group of developed countries with large economies
(e.g., the United States, the European Union, and Japan). Their incentives for
not abusing the WTO's incomplete remedies to engage in frequent temporary
breaches are quite different than those of other countries. I suggest that the
WTO legal rules, as they currently stand, serve their collective interest. This
creates incentives for the group to work together to ensure that such interests
are not undermined.
As mentioned earlier, this set of advanced countries-sometimes
described as the "Quad" or the old "Green Room" countries-dominated the
agenda during the Uruguay Round negotiations. While these powers each made
major concessions, they also sought and obtained several subsequent carve-outs
in the law to safeguard their domestic political economy interests. For example,
agricultural subsidies are treated differently than subsidies for other tradable
goods. 146 Moreover, they added new legal disciplines, such as those on
intellectual property, which stood to benefit their shifting trade interests. 147 In
addition, the WTO regime preserved and further formalized the GATT-era
flexibility to enact trade remedies, such as anti-dumping duties, that serve as a
critical "escape valve" for developed countries facing imports from abroad.
1 48
Finally, as noted in Part I, one might even speculate that the DSU rules were
designed to serve such interests. The substance of the law was shaped in the
"shadow of power."
Developing countries subsequently expressed their dissatisfaction with
the imbalance resulting from the Uruguay Round. They issued a demand that
they would only partake in another multilateral round if it addressed
development concerns. But after twelve years, the so-called Doha Development
Agenda remains stalled.14 9 Consequently, the WTO legal rules, as they
currently stand, still reflect the Uruguay Round negotiating bargain that
advantages these established advanced economies. However, they increasingly
fail to deal with newly-emergent issues on the trade agenda.
146. Compare Agreement on Agriculture arts. 8-11, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 410, with Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures art. 3.1 & Annex 1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter SCM
Agreement].
147. See generally TRIPS Agreement, supra note 47.
148. See generally Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex IA, 1868 U.N.T.S. 279; Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, 1869 U.N.T.S. 154; SCM
Agreement, supra note 146.
149. Dan Ikenson, Lessons from Bali for WTO and Transatlantic Trade Negotiators, FORBES,
Dec. 18, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/danikenson/2013/12/18/lessons-from-bali-for-wto-and
-transatlantic-trade-negotiators (describing the Doha Round as "hopelessly stalled" even after
multilateral negotiations at the 2013 Bali Ministerial forged an agreement on trade facilitation, a "tiny
fraction of the Doha Round's objectives").
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Nevertheless, ensuring the survival and legitimacy of the current WTO
legal regime serves this small, but economically powerful, group of countries'
interests. Although the lack of retrospective remedies may mean that each
could reap short-term gains from a temporary breach, such breaches are not
exactly costless. Beyond the series of costs already mentioned (e.g., reputation,
litigation, transaction, etc.), two others warrant further attention.
First, such breaches lead to greater uncertainty costs. If one's trading
partners frequently engage in temporary breaches, one is less able to rely upon
the treaty commitments made by one's partners. This increased uncertainty
lowers the value of the commitments. It also raises tension among trading
partners, increasing the possibility of relying upon diplomacy to resolve trade
issues and the odds of an inadvertent trade war. A key reason that the
established powers sought to reform the GATT by replacing it with the WTO
was precisely to contain trade disputes among themselves to a judicial realm
and avoid such costs. 150 To engage in repeat temporary breaches would
undermine the progress made.
Second, repeat temporary breaches exact systemic costs for the legal
regime itself. As the WTO regime's existing rules disproportionately favor the
established powers, such systemic costs would lessen the gains that each
derives from the system. As is true of other systems where a set of players
derive disproportionate rents, the collective interest of the group is to ensure
the system's continuation rather than seek to undermine each other through
actions for short-term advantage that lead to the system's collapse.
Furthermore, as noted earlier, the WTO DSB continues to serve this
group's interests. It allows such states to conserve their use of coercive force.
Turning to a judicial solution, even with imperfect remedies, may be a more
effective strategy when sensitive bilateral relations are at stake or complicated
internal political tensions exist. Moreover, the DSB enables the large advanced
economies to manage trade tensions among themselves, and therefore, limits
negative spillover effects from trade conflicts that might impact their
geopolitical alliances. Therefore, even though the large advanced economies
can resort to power to advance their economic interests, they have a stake
invested in preserving the legitimacy of the WTO system overall.
For the large advanced economies, this collective set of costs makes it
unlikely that any would seek to engage in a strategy of repeat temporary
breaches to take advantage of the system's imperfect remedies.151 Again, this is
not to suggest that such countries will never engage in such breaches. Without
the constraints of adverse coercive force, the United States and the European
Union indeed do engage in temporary breaches with greater frequency than
150. Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and
Political Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 247, 250 (2004).
151. Joost Pauwelyn has referred to this set of costs as "community costs," which he notes can
serve as the "kicker" for achieving protection, particularly if WTO rules are conceptualized as operating
under a property rule. See JOOST PAUWELYN, OPTIMAL PROTECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 163-78
(2008).
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other WTO members. After all, faced with a given circumstance, a government
may decide that such breach makes sense. This is especially the case when a
government encounters strong domestic protectionist interests and can reap
near-term political gains deemed critical for the government's survival. The
analysis above simply seeks to explain why such breaches are not widespread
even from powerful states, and why these countries too deem it in their interest
to engage in thick cooperation.
To summarize, the willingness of the established economic powers to
exercise coercive power to constrain other countries, as well as their collective
self-interest in cooperating to maintain the global trading system, help to
explain the puzzle of why countries comply with WTO law despite its lack of
retrospective remedies. Although countries can get away with a temporary
breach without having to pay any compensation for harm caused, such breaches
are not truly costless for any WTO member. But what matters most are not
necessarily the set of costs emphasized by the literature to date (litigation costs,
transaction costs, reputation costs). Overlooked are a series of costs related to
power asymmetries and the legal rules negotiated in the shadow of these
asymmetries. They play the key role in explaining why the WTO system,
despite its imperfect remedies, has functioned well to date.
C. Assessing the Revised Theory
How do we know that the answer given for the puzzle is indeed correct?
The lack of a comprehensive database of temporary breaches of WTO and the
difficulty in compiling such a database make it impossible at present to test its
validity through regression analysis. I therefore offer my theory in conceptual
form, with the hopes that, one day, the data will become available for further
empirical analysis. Meanwhile, I suggest that the theory's explanatory power
can be seen in its ability to clarify two existing trade-related phenomena for
which other theories have not yet offered a compelling explanation.
First, recall that one quandary that has confounded other compliance
theories is the fact that advanced developed countries appear to commit
temporary breaches of WTO law with much greater frequency than developing
countries. Together, the United States and the European Union accounted for
more than half of the WTO's first 300 disputes. More disputes have been
brought against the two than the collective sum levied against all WTO
members classified by the World Bank as low-, lower-middle-, and upper-
middle-income economies. Almost four times as many disputes have been
brought against the United States than against India, the leading respondent
among developing countries that have been part of the WTO since its
formation. 152
152. China has defended more cases than India, but it only acceded to the WTO in 2001. See
Disputes by Country/Territory, supra note 53. The implications of China's entry into the WTO regime
and its economic rise are discussed further in Part III.
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This seems counterintuitive. If the substantive terms of the existing WTO
Agreements largely reflect the established powers' interests, one would think
that it would be the developing countries-i.e., the "terms takers" upon whom
the WTO agreements were foisted as a "take-it-or-leave-it" bargain-that
would engage in temporary breaches most frequently. This should especially be
the case if the treaty itself states that no compensation is necessary for
temporary breaches. Moreover, legal capacity is not a barrier. The concept is
simple and straightforward: ignore one's WTO treaty commitment until one
loses a WTO case and then right before the expiration of the "reasonable period
of time," bring one's actions back in line with one's commitment.
Legitimacy, transnational legal process, and liberal theorists alike fail to
explain why those most invested in shaping the law upon their terms would
then be the most likely to abuse its "free pass." Rational choice theorists, to
date, have suggested that the reason may have to do with the larger size and
wealth of the two established powers. They are better positioned to afford
"efficient breaches" of WTO law, achieved through a rebalancing of
concessions via WTO litigation. While in theory this is true, the facts do not
bear out this explanation. The vast majority of the breaches of WTO law,
including those by the two established powers, are only temporary in-kind and
not of the "efficient breach" variety.
My theory suggests that the reason why established powers are more
inclined to engage in temporary breaches of WTO law is because of the
absence of a strong immediate retaliatory threat to serve as a restraint. Other
countries that may be more dissatisfied with the equitable balance of WTO law
nevertheless adhere to it more closely because of the threat of coercive force.
The established powers face no comparable threat. Yet, they too will not abuse
the WTO's remedies loophole excessively. My theory predicts that they will
engage in temporary breaches only at a level where it does not undermine the
overall stability of the WTO regime altogether nor introduce greater
uncertainty in their bilateral trade relations.
The empirical evidence bears this out. Despite the greater ability of the
established powers to exploit the WTO's imperfect remedies to reap temporary
gains from breach, they have done so at a fairly modest level. On average, only
6.4 complaints are filed against the United States each year. The largest number
of disputes against the United States concern anti-dumping duties.1 53 In such
cases, the scope of a breach is contained; the breach involves temporary
protection of a discrete set of goods rather than an all-encompassing illegal
trade policy. Such cases therefore exert a lower systemic cost. What we see are
established powers exercising self-restraint. Their optimal strategy is to engage
153. As of November 2014, nearly two-fifths of the cases filed against the United States (47 of
121 complaints) concerned anti-dumping. This is larger than the percentage filed for any other subject
matter. Author's computation based on information provided by World Trade Organization on
breakdown of disputes by country/territory and by agreement. See Disputes by Country/Territory, supra
note 53; Disputes by Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispue
/dispu agreementsindex e.htm (last visited Dec. 4, 2014).
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in temporary breaches only to an extent that such breaches do not threaten the
system's overall stability or legitimacy-which appears to be exactly what they
are aiming to pull off.
A second quandary that the theory addresses is the question of why the
WTO's growing "remedy gap" has had little impact on the actual behavior of
states. As Rachel Brewster has highlighted, the length of WTO litigation
proceedings has almost doubled since the late 1990s.114 This increases the
length of the "free pass," and hence its value. The conventional rational choice
account suggests that this development should increase the marginal benefits
associated with a temporary breach, and hence, the frequency of such
breaches.1 55 It is therefore worrisome. Brewster has warned that the WTO
system faces three negative consequences from the increasing remedy gap:
first, it creates a "de facto escape clause" that is more generous than the WTO's
de jure escape clause; second, it generates a "counterproductive influence" on
the desire of states to negotiate settlements of trade disputes; and third, it
creates an "incentive to subvert the regime by acting outside of the legal
framework."' 156 Unless reforms are enacted, she warns, the growing remedy gap
"undermines the WTO's credibility as an effective adjudicator of trade
disputes."
' 157
Despite the dire warnings, the negative consequences have not come to
pass. The numbers of temporary breaches do not appear to be increasing
significantly. Nor are more countries necessarily choosing to resolve their
disputes outside of the WTO. The question is why not. So far, the literature has
not provided a convincing answer for why, despite the failure to adopt reforms
to mitigate the growing remedy gap, the WTO legal system has not seen an
uptick in treaty noncompliance.
My theory suggests that so long as coercive power is available, any
marginal gains from the increased remedy gap can be offset through an upward
adjustment of coercive power that increases the marginal cost of a temporary
breach. Even where coercive force is not at play, so long as the player's self-
interest in upholding the existing regime continues to outweigh the now-higher
gains, it will not breach. Consequently, the growing length of time required for
WTO litigation has not yet affected WTO dispute settlement materially.
This is not to suggest that the growing remedy gap will have no impact
going forward. As I will discuss in Part III, there are a few potential worrisome
flashpoints. But it does suggest that the need to reform WTO dispute settlement
154. The average length of a WTO case that is appealed at both the first-instance and
compliance stages has grown from twenty-four to forty-one months. The overall systemic impact is even
greater, as more cases are appealed and proceed to a compliance hearing as compared to the 1990s. See
Brewster, supra note 8, at 119-25.
155. This assumes that costs remain static and the additional benefit gain is greater than the
original difference between costs and benefits.
156. Brewster, supra note 8, at 104.
157. Id. Specifically, Brewster has suggested that even if the prospect of retrospective
remedies is not possible, the WTO ought to consider implementing preliminary injunctions and revising
the timing of Article 22.6 arbitration panels as a means of addressing the remedy gap. Id. at 150-58.
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rules on account of the growing remedy gap may be less pressing than
believed. So long as coercive force is available and can be adjusted, it can act
as a means to regulate the negative impact of the growing length of WTO
litigation proceedings.
The central importance of power asymmetries to these quandaries should
not be altogether surprising. Others have shown it to be a relevant factor to
other facets of the WTO legal system.158 In this Article, I simply demonstrate
its relevance to issues of WTO treaty compliance in the face of imperfect
remedies. Further verification of this theory will require additional efforts to
develop a database for empirical analysis. But for now, I suggest that this
theory offers the best explanation for why we observe the existing patterns of
temporary breach by WTO members and why the WTO system functions
effectively despite its incomplete remedies.
III. THE CHALLENGES AHEAD
If the theory proffered above is correct, then this raises a number of
interesting implications for the future of the WTO. What I have suggested is
that the stability and reliability of WTO legal commitments has rested on the
willingness of established powers to deploy instruments of coercive force to
restrain others from taking advantage of the system's built-in loophole for
temporary breaches. Although powerful states themselves take advantage of
this loophole with greater frequency, they too share a collective interest in
monitoring and limiting their use of this loophole, lest it lead to the collapse of
a global trading order that furthers their interests.
In Part III, I suggest that this stable ordering will confront a number of
challenges in the years ahead. Before elaborating on these challenges, note that
if one suspects that this ordering faces danger, one option is to reform WTO
law to limit and/or close this remedies loophole. That option, however, appears
to be off the table. Calls to reform WTO remedies have fallen largely on deaf
ears. While some proposals have been put forward in the WTO Rules
Negotiations, none have sought to introduce punitive damages or retrospective
remedies. Reform is extremely unlikely. The lack of any meaningful progress
in the multilateral negotiations means that the Uruguay Round bargain, and its
incomplete remedies, will likely hold for the foreseeable future.
Against this backdrop, several trends are emerging that threaten to upset
the relative stability of the WTO order to date. Below I elaborate on each
phenomenon. Each raises questions about whether scenarios will emerge with
greater frequency in the future in which a given state will choose rationally to
engage in a temporary breach. Were temporary breaches of WTO law to
158. See, e.g., Chad P. Bown, Trade Remedies and World Trade Organization Dispute
Settlement: Why Are So Few Challenged?, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 515 (2005) (discussing trade remedies);
Tobias Bbhmelt & Gabriele Spilker, The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism-Enforcement, State
Power, and Dispute Recurrence (Swiss Nat'l Ctr. of Competence in Research, NCCR Trade Working
Paper No. 2013/071, May 2013), http://www.wti.org/fileadmin/user-upload/nccr-trade.ch/wp I/Working
_Paper 20137.pdf (discussing dispute recurrence).
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increase dramatically, this would certainly weaken the WTO system and
increase the temptation to operate outside of it. Therefore, how the WTO as an
institution-as well as the established economic powers-respond to these
potentially disruptive trends will be critical for determining the WTO's
continued future success.
A. The Rise of China
When the Uruguay Round was concluded in 1994, China was not part of
the negotiations. It only acceded to the WTO in 2001. WTO accession provided
an impetus to embark on a wide range of economic reforms that laid the
foundation for a decade of impressive growth. Today, China is already the
world's second-largest economy and forecast to be the world's largest before
2030.159 The rise of China introduces a complication to the narrative discussed
in Part II.
Where China may once have been similar to its developing country
counterparts in being vulnerable to leverage exerted through coercive force,
this is increasingly no longer the case. Bilateral economic relations between
China and other major powers are now one among equals with both sides
locked in an interdependent relationship. 160 China's economy is not dependent
on preferential market access for its goods. As the largest market for several
goods and the world's biggest creditor, China has evolved to a point where its
trade policy cannot be shaped through external coercive force.
At the same time, however, China does not share the same strong
systemic interests as the other major established powers in safeguarding the
WTO's legitimacy. The Uruguay Round bargain does not take into account
Chinese interests and domestic constraints to the same extent as it does
American, European, or Japanese interests and constraints. The terms of
China's accession impose several additional terms on it to which other WTO
members are not subject. 161
This places China in a category of its own. It is neither vulnerable to
coercive force to restrain it from engaging in temporary breaches, nor does it
share the same incentives to engage in restraint out of collective self-interest.
Moreover, its economy is of a size that its trading partners cannot ignore. Yet,
despite this posture, the maintenance of a stable global trading system is
important for China. External trade remains vital for China's economic growth.
Still, China may calculate that it can afford to engage in temporary breaches at
least as frequently as the United States and the European Union have, without
159. China 'To Overtake US and Dominate Trade by 2030', BBC NEWS, Mar. 24, 2011,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business- 12848449.
160. Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is reported to have asked, "How do you deal
toughly with your banker?" Ewen MacAskill, WikiLeaks: Hillary Clinton's Question: How Can We
Stand up to Beiing?, GUARDIAN, Dec. 4, 2010, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/04
/wikileaks-cables-hillary-clinton-beijing.
161. For a more elaborate discussion of these additional burdens, see, for example, Julia Ya
Qin, WTO-Plus' Obligations and Their Implications for the P/TO Legal System-An Appraisal of the
China Accession Protocol, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 483 (2003).
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undermining systemic legitimacy. It may even decide to go further, especially
if it calculates that the system can withstand such pressure and other states,
because of their greater self-interest in preserving the WTO system, will act to
safeguard it.
In future work, I will elaborate further on how China is deploying
temporary breaches to its long-term economic advantage. Needless to say, trade
with China is already emerging as a challenge for economic policymakers
worldwide. From 2009 to 2013, China became the most frequent target of new
WTO cases.
162
For the moment, China stands alone as a maverick challenger to the
oligopolistic interests of the established powers. Other economies that have
experienced spectacular economic growth since the Uruguay Round, such as
South Korea, do not have sufficient scale to match the major powers. They also
remain vulnerable to leverage in non-trade areas (e.g., security). Still, the
possibility exists that other emerging economies may one day join its ranks.
Even if they do not, the theory predicts that the continued rise of China by itself
will serve as a growing source of tension to the WTO system.
B. Russian Exceptionalism
Among the other so-called "BRICS," the theory suggests that the other
worrying flashpoint is Russia. Like China, Russia was not part of the initial
Uruguay Round negotiations. It only acceded to the WTO in August 2012.
However, unlike China, Russia has not experienced spectacular economic
growth, nor is it expected to become a major economic power. Nevertheless, I
suggest that Russia remains a potential concern due to a set of exceptional
circumstances.
For several reasons, Russia is not likely to be swayed by coercive
force. 163 First, Russian exports are not dependent on trade preferences. Russia
does not qualify for the U.S. GSP program, and less than three percent of its
exports to the European Union fall under the European GSP program.
164
Second, Russian exports are concentrated in commodities which its partners
depend on for their energy and industrial concerns. In other words, Russia is
more likely to use its exports as leverage over its trading partners than vice
162. Author's computation based on information available at Chronological List of Disputes
Cases, supra note 70. If multiple complaints filed on the same issue are counted as one, then China
ranks second, behind the United States.
163. The recent Crimea crisis has highlighted the limited options available for an effective use
of coercive force. See, e.g., Steve Chapman, Sanctions on Russia Won't Work, CHI. TR1B., Mar. 9, 2014,
http://articles.chicagotribune.con/2014-03-09/news/ct-russia-sanctions-oped-chapman-0309-20140309
1 economic-sanctions-grain-embargo-u-s-economic-embargo; Daniel Drezner, Bringing the Pain,
FOREIGN POL'Y, Mar. 7, 2014, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/03/07/bringing-the-pain/; Kevin Drum,
Chart of the Day: Why US Economic Sanctions on Russia Won't Have Much Impact, MOTHER JONES,
Mar. 4, 2014, http://www.mothedones.com/kevin-drum/2014/03/chart-day-why-us-economic-sanctions
-russia-wont-have-much-impact; Jennifer Rubin, How's That Interdependent World Working Out?,
WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2014/03/13/hows
-that-interdependent-world-working-out.
164. Commission Staff Working Document, supra note 139, at 13 n.164.
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versa. Third, Russia is not actively seeking PTAs with major trading powers.
Instead, its PTA strategy is focused on the creation of a Russia-led customs
union with its immediate neighbors, as a means of maintaining its geopolitical
influence in its near periphery. Finally, Russia is not dependent on others for
security, energy, etc. As a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council,
more often than not, others seek its cooperation on international affairs than
vice versa.
In addition, unlike China, Russia is not yet heavily invested in preserving
the WTO system as-is. Russia's recent economic boom arose out of rising
commodity prices, not on account of growing manufacturing or services trade.
Despite having acceded to the WTO on his watch, President Putin is widely
known to be a WTO skeptic. 165 Rather than bringing immediate benefits, he has
warned that moves to comply with WTO rules will bring Russia higher
unemployment and budget revenue shortfalls in the near-term. 166 Furthermore,
unlike China, Russian manufacturing is not an embedded part of the global
supply chain. Therefore, Russia has relatively little at stake in terms of the
success of the WTO system as a whole. The main benefit of WTO membership
for Russia is the ability to escape from discriminatory tariff treatment such as
the U.S. Jackson-Vanik Trade Act. But WTO accession is not seen as a means
of promoting domestic economic reform or furthering trade growth, as was true
for China in the early 2000s. As Fredrik Erikson, a director of Europe's leading
trade think tank, has put it, Russia entered the WTO "without a clear idea of
why it wants to belong to this club and it has no intention of participating."'
167
Therefore, the theory predicts that Russia is also likely to take advantage
of the WTO's lack of retrospective remedies to engage in temporary breaches.
This will allow Russia to backtrack on its WTO commitments. Indeed, we are
already witnessing signs that this is the case. The EU trade commissioner
accused Russia of reneging on its WTO commitments only three months after it
joined.168 The European Union and Japan brought forward cases against Russia
less than a year after its accession. 169 The following year, they filed three more
complaints, none of which have been settled.170 By comparison, the first
complaint against China was filed over two years after its accession and
165. Andrew Kramer, In Outburst, Putin Says WT.O. Rules Don 't Apply, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 9,
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/09/business/global/09wto.html.
166. Gleb Bryanski, Putin Says Russia's Economy to Suffer from WTO Entry, REuTERS, Nov.
21, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/21/us-russia-putin-wto-idUSBRE8AK14W20121121.
167. Joshua Chaffin, Europe Cools on Russia's WTO Accession, FIN. TIMEs, Dec. 5, 2012,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ff524424-3eff- 1 e2-9214-00l44feabdc0.html.
168. Id.
169. Request for Consultation by Japan, Russian Federation-Recycling Fee on Motor
Vehicles, WT/DS463/1 (July 26, 2013); Request for Consultation by the European Union, Russian
Federation-Recycling Fee on Motor Vehicles, WT/DS462/1 (July 11, 2013).
170. Request for Consultation by the European Union, Russia-Tariff Treatment on Certain
Agricultural and Manufacturing Products, WT/DS485/l (Nov. 4, 2014); Request for Consultation by
the European Union, Russian Federation-Anti-Dumping Duties on Light Commercial Vehicles from
Germany and Italy, WT/DS479/1 (May 26, 2014); Request for Consultation by the European Union,
Russian Federation-Measures on the Importation of Live Pigs, Pork and Other Pig Products from the
European Union, WT/DS475/1 (Apr. 14, 2014).
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quickly settled.'7 ' Russia has also not hesitated to deploy trade-related threats
against its neighbors for geopolitical purposes. 172 In short, Russia is also likely
to become another source of tension within the WTO system, albeit for reasons
very different than China.
C. The Growth of Trade Among Developing Countries
Another major trend affecting global trade flows is the growth of trade
among developing countries, what was once referred to as "South-South trade."
In 1990, the share of developing countries' exports going to other developing
countries was only twenty-nine percent. 173 By 2010, it had grown to fifty-four
percent. 74 Trade among developing countries accounted for twenty-three
percent of total global trade in 2010, up from only eleven percent in 1998.75
Such trade is also subject to different dynamics. When both parties are
developing countries, it is less likely that either can exert coercive force over
the other. Most developing countries do not provide preferential trade benefits
to other developing countries. Even if they do, they are not at a level akin to
developed countries' GSP programs. PTAs between developing countries are
much more limited in scope because they are subject to the weaker
requirements of the Enabling Clause rather than the more onerous ones of
GATT Article XXIV. Furthermore, their smaller markets make trade
preferences less valuable. In short, two developing countries have less leverage
over each other than would be the case if one of the parties were a major
advanced economy. In addition, neither party necessarily has a strong systemic
interest in safeguarding the WTO regime.
Consequently, the temptation to engage in a temporary breach is greater
in such situations. Nevertheless, such breaches remain infrequent for several
reasons. First, much of this trade is in raw materials. Where the importing
country is dependent on the good as an input for its industry, it may not gain
from stronger protections levied against that good. Second, there may be
longer-term gains from strong bilateral cooperation that outweigh the short-
term gains of a temporary breach.176 Third, the system provides for other
171. See Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, China- Value-Added Tax on Integrated
Circuits, WT/DS309/8 (Oct. 6, 2005). Request for Consultation by the United States, China-Value-
Added Tax on Integrated Circuits, WT/DS309/I (Mar. 23, 2004).
172. Judy Dempsey, How Russia Bullies the EU's Eastern Neighbors, CARNEGIE EUR. (Sept. 9,
2013), http://camegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa-52903; David Herszenhom, Russia Putting a Strong
Arm on Neighbors, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/23/world
/europe/russia-putting-a-strong-arm-on-neighbors.html.
173. Trade and Development, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.orgfenglish/thewto-e
/coher e/mdg_e/development e.htm (last visited Dec. 4, 2014).
174. See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., SOUTH-SOUTH TRADE MONITOR No. 1, at 1
(June 2012), http://unctad.org/enIPublicationsLibrary/webditctab20I2d2_en.pdf.
175. Id. Such trade is growing at a much faster rate (nineteen percent per annum) than the
global average (thirteen percent per annum).
176. For example, this may be the case if the parties are seeking to build up a regional
organization that serves both parties' interests. Or it may be the case that the parties belong to a political
grouping (e.g., the G33) that affords both sides greater leverage in international negotiations.
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mechanisms for reinstating temporary protection (e.g., anti-dumping or
countervailing duties). As trade among developing countries has grown, so too
has the use of trade remedies by developing countries against other developing
countries. 177 Such instruments, which are legal under WTO law, may serve a
preferable substitute to outright breach.
The recent Dominican Republic-Safeguard Measures cases offer an
example of a situation where the increase in trade among developing countries
contributes to the temptation to engage in a temporary breach. Between 2003
and 2009, the Dominican Republic experienced a rapid increase in imports of
polypropylene bags and tubular fabrics from four Central American countries,
178China, and the United States. For Chinese and American producers, the
Dominican market represented a tiny share of their overall exports of the
products. 17 9 The same, however, was not true of the Central American
countries. 18  Knowing this, the Dominican Republic enacted WTO-illegal
safeguards to provide additional protection to its domestic producers. As
expected, given the relatively low volume of trade, neither the United States
nor China found it worthwhile to employ coercive force to compel the
Dominican Republic to abandon its illegal policy. Instead, the task was left to
the four Central American countries. They collectively brought WTO disputes
against the Dominican Republic and prevailed. 18 1 The Dominican Republic
abandoned its illegal safeguards before the "reasonable period of time" expired,
but managed to provide its producers with three additional years of protection
as a result of the system's built-in "free pass."
Had American or Chinese producers had the major share of the
Dominican Republic's market, the threatened deployment of coercive force as
potential retaliation likely would have caused Dominican policymakers to think
twice about the temporary breach. But because the trade was concentrated
instead with Central American countries with little leverage over it, the
Dominican Republic went ahead. Temporary breach arises because of the
shifting dynamics of trade toward a South-South axis.
The extent to which proliferation of trade among developing countries
will increase the prevalence of temporary breach will depend on the specific
composition of goods whose trade is increasing. As noted, if this rising trade is
concentrated in raw materials and other inputs, temporary breaches are less
177. Chad P. Bown, The Global Resort to Antidumping, Safeguards, and Other Trade




178. Chad P. Bown & Mark Wu, Safeguards and the Perils of Preferential Trade Agreements:
Dominican Republic-Safeguard Measures, 13 WORLD TRADE REv. 179, 191 fig.3 (2014).
179. The Dominican Republic accounted for no more than 0.2% of the total Chinese
worldwide exports of two affected products. Id. at 198 fig.4.
180. The Dominican Republic accounted for roughly forty percent of the total global exports of
the two affected products for Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Honduras and seventeen percent for
Guatemala. Id.
181. Panel Report, Dominican Republic-Safeguard Measures on Imports of Polypropylene
Bags and Tubular Fabric, WT/DS415-418/R (Jan. 31, 2012).
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likely because of harmful downstream effects. On the other hand, if trade rises
in manufactured products, such as bags, in which imports crowd out domestic
substitutes, and anti-dumping or countervailing duties are unavailable, then
governments in developing countries may increasingly resort to temporary
breach.
The other factor that will affect the prevalence of temporary breach is the
response of powerful states. In the example above, the Dominican Republic
acted because it rightly calculated that neither the United States nor China
would bother to use coercive force to counter its breach. But had either done
so, the response might have chilled future acts of this sort by other developing
countries. Instead, the non-response is encouraging other developing countries
to also experiment with temporary breach.
For example, Ukraine likely breached its WTO commitments in 2012
when it enacted a safeguard tariff against imports of cars.' 82 In this case, the
largest exporter of cars into the Ukraine was the European Union, but over
twenty-five percent of its car imports come from developing countries such as
Russia, Turkey, and India.1 83 Although Ukraine is dependent on the European
Union for GSP benefits, it calculated correctly that the European Union would
not bring coercive force to bear. This is because the European Union is seeking
to entice Ukraine into its Eastern Partnership, as an alternative to Ukraine
entering into a customs union with Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus.
184
Frustrated with the slow pace of WTO litigation, several trading partners
decided to retaliate directly. Turkey retaliated by imposing a tax on Ukrainian
walnuts. 185 Russia also decided to impose trade sanctions in response, on
Ukrainian chocolate, coal, and glass. 186 Only Japan has decided to proceed
down the traditional route of filing a WTO case against Ukraine.
87
This may mark the start of a trend of developing countries increasingly
resorting to "self-help" retaliatory mechanisms in order to limit the harm
caused to its exporters as a result of a breach of WTO law by another
developing country. Unlike the coercive force mechanisms brought to bear by
182. I use the caveat "likely" here because its legality is still pending adjudication by the
WTO. However, given the strict "unforeseen development" requirement necessary for enacting a
safeguard, it is unlikely that Ukraine's actions are legal. See Request for Consultations by Japan,
Ukraine-Definitive Safeguard Measures on Certain Passenger Cars, WT/DS468/1 (Nov. 4, 2013).
183. Author's calculation is based on information available in the U.N. Comtrade database for
the two HS-6 lines on which safeguards were imposed. See Dep't of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, supra note
77.
184. The Eastern Partnership is a project devised by the European Union to engage with six
former Soviet Republics. Its success is viewed as dependent on Ukraine's participation. See Playing
East Against West, ECONOMIST, Nov. 23, 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21590585-
success-eastem-partnership-depends-ukraine-playing-east-against-west.
185. Tom Miles, Turkish Trade Sanction is Warning Shot in Ukraine Car Tariff Row,
REUTERS, June 12, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/12/trade-ukraine-cars
-idUSL5NOEO32C20130612.
186. Tom Miles, Russia Targets Ukrainian Chocolate in Car Trade Spat, REUTERS, July 9,
2013, http://uk.reuters.com/article/201 3/07/09/uk-trade-ukraine-cars-idUKBRE968OLR20t37O9.
187. Request for Consultations by Japan, Ukraine-Definitive Safeguard Measures on
Passenger Cars, WT/DS468/1 (Nov. 4, 2013).
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developed countries, which are generally recognized as legal under WTO law,
the legality of these forms of direct retaliation is questionable. 188 For example,
Russia's decision to ban Ukrainian chocolates, ostensibly on health grounds,
may turn out not to comply with its requirements under the WTO's SPS
Agreement.189 A situation in which developing countries increasingly engage in
tit-for-tat temporary breaches instead of WTO dispute settlement to resolve
trade disputes would certainly prove worrisome to the WTO.
The WTO, as an institutional actor alone, is ill-equipped to deal with the
challenges discussed above. Its main enforcement power is to adjudicate and
issue sanctions. But in the case of temporary breach, the strategy on the part of
the violators is to avoid ever getting to the stage where institutional powers
kick in. Instead, violators seek to reap temporary benefits as allowed by WTO's
legal loophole. Countering the challenges described above will require
concerted action on the part of the established powers.
To manage China's rise, they will need to see to it that China perceives
the WTO system to offer it sufficient gains so that it has an embedded stake in
preserving the system. This may require addressing certain elements of the
system that China finds to be discriminatory. In addition, China's behavior on
temporary breaches, in the near term, will likely mirror that of the United
States and the European Union. As a rising power, Chinese officials will
perceive that China ought to be entitled to take advantage of this loophole at a
level similar to that of other powers. To the extent that the established powers
find China's use of temporary breaches to be too excessive, they may need to
consider curbing their own use of this WTO loophole in order to spark China to
do the same.
In some ways, the challenge is even more difficult with Russia. Again,
the task is to convince Russia of the gains that the WTO system offers such that
it too has an embedded stake in its preservation. But Russia's trade is much less
manufacturing-oriented, and Russian firms are less woven into global supply
chains. This makes immediate gains less apparent. The other alternative is to
raise the stakes in confronting Russia on trade matters, but the lack of
instruments of coercive force makes this also difficult. In the end, the system
may have to find ways to live with welcoming a "bad actor" into the family,
but make clear that its influence is limited until its behavior improves.
Dealing with the rising use of temporary breaches by developing
countries against other developing countries may be the easiest issue to
address. Temporary breaches arise because the parties do not think that
developed countries will intervene with coercive force in such instances.
188. See Brewster, supra note 11, at 1145 (declaring such forms of immediate retaliation
outside the DSU to be illegal).
189. See Andrew E. Kramer, Chocolate Factory, Trade War Victim, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30,
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10 /30/business/intemational/ukrainian-chocolates-caught-in-trade
-war-between-europe-and-russia.html (noting that some of Russia's other neighbors have questioned
whether Russian restrictions comply with WTO law).
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Limiting this behavior will require developed countries to expand the
boundaries of when they intervene to include situations where their own stakes
are low. In other words, developed countries face a choice. They can devote
more resources to global "policing" of trade law. Or they can choose to live in
a world where we see more tit-for-tat temporary breaches among developing
countries that weakens the WTO system overall.
Again, the recent example of Ukraine's temporary breach over car tariffs
proves instructive. Turkey and Russia likely responded as they did because
they did not perceive the likelihood of intervention by developed powers to be
high. This was correct, at least with respect to the European Union. Generally
speaking, it would have also been a correct assumption to make about Japan.
Historically, Japan has been reluctant to adjudicate disputes at the WTO,
especially on its own,1 90 and the Ukrainian market represented a tiny share (less
than 0.6%) of total Japanese car exports. 91 But after Russia and Turkey
responded with their tit-for-tat actions, Japanese officials saw the choice at
hand and stepped up to the challenge of confronting Ukraine. Contrast this
response with that of the United States and China following the Dominican
Republic's temporary breach. More willingness to devote resources to
intervene even when the stakes are relatively low, along the lines of Japan's
recent actions, is necessary if established powers seek to dissuade future
instances of temporary breaches by developing countries.
The decision on the part of the established powers in the Uruguay Round
negotiations to preserve the system's incomplete remedies may have proven to
be relatively inconsequential for the WTO's first two decades. It simply gave
rise to an interesting intellectual puzzle concerning how we should think about
WTO treaty compliance. But in the coming years, this decision will prove to
have much more serious implications. It will force established powers to
reevaluate, in response to shifting economic and geopolitical trends, whether
they wish to maintain or alter their levels of utilizing temporary breaches,
coercive force, and WTO dispute settlement. What they choose in turn will
determine the extent to which greater levels of WTO breaches give rise to more
contentious trade disputes. At issue then is nothing less than the time-honored
question of how power ought to be deployed in the shadow of the law.
CONCLUSION
The WTO has been trumpeted as a triumph of an internationalist legal
vision. It personifies the possibility of states voluntarily subsuming sovereign
regulatory decision-making to an international rules-based organization in the
interests of advancing collective global welfare. As Steve Charnovitz has
proclaimed, "To date, the experiment of the WTO has achieved success beyond
190. For an explanation of why this is the case, see DAVIS, supra note 56, at 185-243.
191. Author's calculation based on information available in the U.N. Comtrade database for
the two HS-6 lines on which safeguards were imposed. See Dep't of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, supra note
77.
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the expectation of many observers. . . . More so perhaps than any other
international organization, the WTO is an institution of international law....
WTO rules matter because they are enforced in a strong dispute settlement
system."
'1 92
The success of the WTO as the enforcer and arbiter of global rules is
often presumed to rest on systemic elements. The WTO dispute settlement
system, the regime's self-proclaimed "crown jewel," encompasses features
such as compulsory jurisdiction, detailed procedural rules, a formalized
appellate review process, and the possibility of sanctions. These features are
viewed with envy by other international legal regimes that seek to enhance
their own efficacy and legitimacy.
No doubt these systemic elements represent important innovations in the
domain of international legal regimes. But this Article raises questions as to
whether these elements are truly what underlie the WTO's success. After all,
when devising the WTO legal system, its treaty drafters left a gaping loophole.
Countries are permitted to engage in temporary breaches of their treaty
obligations without fear of WTO-authorized sanctions, so long as such
breaches are time-delimited and are eliminated by the deadline mandated by
the WTO judiciary. With minimum legal savvy, a country can manipulate the
WTO's remedies loophole to escape its treaty obligations without fear of
punishment for at least three years, and possibly several years longer.
The efficacy of the WTO rests on the question of why countries do not
repeatedly exploit this loophole to the point where their behavior substantially
weakens the rules-based legal system. This Article suggests that the answer lies
not necessarily with the system's managerial elements, the strength of its
underlying norms, its transnational legal processes, or its liberal foundations.
Nor is it simply all about reciprocity, reputation, or litigation/transaction
costs-although these do play a role. Rather, the WTO has functioned well as
an arbiter of global rules on account of perhaps the oldest and crudest
instrument for enforcing order in an international system-power. In the desire
to hold out the WTO as the paragon of a progressive vision of international
legalism, the continuing primacy of power for this legal order has been
underemphasized by scholars to date. But we should be careful to describe the
WTO as representative of a global order where states willingly turn first to
courts to resolve disputes before resorting to power-for this is not necessarily
the case.
As this Article has illustrated, the mechanisms in which power helps to
sustain and reinforce rules in the global economic order are much more subtle
than in the days when states would simply send warships into harbors to secure
market access for their goods. Nor is the use of power in the world today even
as overt as it was in the 1980s, when the United States turned to unilateral
retaliatory mechanisms arbitrated by its administrative state to force its trading
192. Steve Charnovitz, The World Trade Organization in 2020, 1 J. INT'L L. & INT'L REL. 167,
167-68, 172 (2005).
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partners to abide by their trade treaties.' 93
Instead, power flows through a legal regime that, by design, is dynamic
and evolving-thereby creating possibilities for powerful states to exert
leverage over weaker states. The incomplete nature of the WTO legal bargain
allows for the creation of a set of additional costs associated with temporary
breaches for many states, ranging from the potential loss of preferential trade
benefits to damaging prospects for future trade preferences. Realizing such
costs, however, depends on the willingness of the more powerful states to
resort to power asymmetries to enforce the system's rules. Existing economic
powers do so, I suggest, because the system's rules reflect their collective self-
interest, and hence they share a systemic interest in ensuring that the system
remains stable. It is this dynamic-in which power asymmetries interact with
an incomplete and evolving legal regime-that answers the puzzling questions
of: (a) why states have only exploited the WTO's temporary breach loophole
periodically rather than with regularity, and (b) why, when such breaches do
arise, they are more frequently undertaken not by pariah states but instead by
liberal economic powers.
The success of the WTO as an international court, therefore, should not
be seen as offering unmitigated support for the triumph of international rule of
law over power diplomacy. Instead, the story is much more nuanced. It is true
that under the WTO, the notion that "might makes right" is no longer fully
correct. Trade superpowers lose plenty of cases, and they willingly comply
with these rulings. But it is also not the case that power no longer matters and
that all states are equal. Instead, "might" still shapes the contours of the law as
to what is "right." Equally important, "might" ensures that this law is followed.
Thus, it is not the normative appeal of WTO law, but the fact that WTO law
has and continues to be effectively coupled with power, that is responsible for
the success of WTO dispute settlement in its first two decades. What the WTO
demonstrates is that the relationship between power and law is complementary;
power is what enables the effective functioning of a rule-of-law regime.
But power, like trade itself, is fluid. As economic power shifts east and
trade flows between developing countries grow, scenarios emerge whereby
certain countries may find it more appealing to undermine WTO law by
engaging in temporary breaches. The WTO's challenge will be to find ways to
prevent such scenarios from becoming too commonplace. This will require a
commitment on the part of established powers to share and deploy power more
broadly than they have in the past. If they do, then the WTO system will
continue to thrive, even without reform of its imperfect remedies system. But if
they do not, then temporary noncompliance with WTO law may very well
grow more rampant.
As the WTO enters its third decade, it stands at a crossroads not only with
respect to the Doha Round negotiations but also with its dispute settlement
193. See William R. Cline, Reciprocity: A New Approach to World Trade Policy?, in TRADE
POLICY IN THE 1980s 121, 136 (William R. Cline ed., 1983) (discussing the retaliatory potential of
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974).
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mechanism. Unlike the former, the latter does not face the imminent threat of
unraveling or being displaced. But if the WTO DSB is to remain the strong
bulwark of international adjudication that it has been, much more than making
tweaks to the DSB's rules will be required. Power, writ large, must be
rebalanced within the system to accommodate the new geopolitical realities.
Otherwise, the system will slowly fragment as its major actors work outside of
its confines to tackle emergent issues in international trade.
Rethinking the Temporary Breach Puzzle
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